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I. Introduction 
Every year or so, the caseload of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery tends to gravitate toward one or more timely topics in 
the law of corporations. In the mid-2000s—after a booming 
economy but a triad of corporate scandals at Enron, Worldcom, 
and Tyco—the topic was backdating of stock options. That issue 
culminated in the Court’s decision in Ryan v. Gifford.1 From that 
case, and a handful of others involving similar issues,2 a fairly 
cohesive body of law developed around 2007 regarding potential 
improprieties in the issuance of stock options. After the subprime 
mortgage crisis, the issue of the relationship between directors’ 
duty of oversight and risk management came to the fore. In In re 
American International Group, Inc. Consolidated Derivative 
Litigation (AIG),3 the Court of Chancery held that corporate 
insiders could be personally liable for failing to implement and 
monitor effective internal reporting controls against fraudulent 
                                                                                                     
 1. Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 358 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that the 
intentional violation of a shareholder-approved stock option plan is disloyal to 
the corporation and constitutes bad faith conduct). 
 2. See, e.g., MBKS Co. v. Reddy, 924 A.2d 965, 967 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(regarding grant of common stock for inadequate consideration), aff’d sub nom. 
Reddy v. MBKS Co., 945 A.2d 1080 (Del. 2008); In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 
563, 592–93 (Del. Ch. 2007) (regarding “spring-loaded” options). Another 
important line of cases clarified how the duty of good faith functions as part of 
the fiduciary duties owed by corporate directors. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006). After much speculation about whether the duty of 
good faith was a third fiduciary duty, the Delaware Supreme Court defined the 
duty of good faith as “a subsidiary element, i.e., a condition, of the fundamental 
duty of loyalty” and not as a discrete fiduciary duty. Id. at 370 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 3. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Consol. Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. 
Ch. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP, No. 454, 2011 WL 13545 (Del. Jan. 3, 2011). 
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financial transactions.4 Shortly after the AIG decision, the Court 
again addressed directors’ duties of oversight, but this time as 
they related to business risks as opposed to compliance risks. The 
Court of Chancery held in In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation5 that “the mere fact that a company takes 
on business risk and suffers losses—even catastrophic losses—
does not evidence misconduct, and without more, is not a basis for 
personal director liability.”6 And just two years ago, as the 
economy showed tepid signs of improvement and a handful of 
corporate acquirers went bargain hunting, the poison pill made a 
curtain call. In four successive cases, Selectica, Inc. v. Versata 
Enterprises, Inc.,7 Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. 
Riggio,8 eBay Domestic Holdings., Inc. v. Newmark,9 and, most 
prominently, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,10 the 
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court examined 
the use of the poison pill in a wide variety of factual scenarios. 
Collectively, these cases provided new clarity on when and how 
directors can make use of this defensive measure.  
                                                                                                     
 4. Id. at 776–78, 799. 
 5. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
 6. Id. at 130. As the court further expounded, 
[t]here are significant differences between failing to oversee employee 
fraudulent or criminal conduct [as allegedly occurred in AIG] and failing to 
recognize the extent of a Company’s business risk. . . . While it may be 
tempting to say that directors have the same duties to monitor and 
oversee business risk, . . . [t]o impose oversight liability on directors for 
failure to monitor ‘excessive’ risk would involve courts in conducting 
hindsight evaluations of decisions at the heart of the business judgment of 
directors. Oversight duties under Delaware law are not designed to subject 
directors, even expert directors, to personal liability for failure to predict 
the future and to properly evaluate business risk. 
Id. at 131. 
 7. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 
703062 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, 
Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010). 
 8. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 
2010), aff’d, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011) (unpublished table decision). 
 9. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 10. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
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This phenomenon of multiple cases posing different facets of 
timely questions of corporate law is not the result of intelligent 
design or stellar forces, but the natural consequence of the Court 
of Chancery’s role as the United States’ premier business court. 
Delaware is home to just shy of one million business entities—
more than its population—and more than 60% of the companies 
comprising the Fortune 500.11 The internal affairs doctrine holds 
that internal disputes between a company’s managers and 
shareholders are governed by the law of the state of 
incorporation.12 And, if Delaware law applies to these disputes, it 
makes sense for Delaware jurists—at the trial level, the 
Chancellor and four Vice Chancellors of the Court of Chancery 
and, at the appellate level, the five Justices of the Delaware 
Supreme Court13—to be the ones to apply it.14 Consequently, the 
                                                                                                     
 11. DEL. DIV. OF CORPS. ANN. REP. 1 (2011), http://corp.delaware. 
gov/2011CorpAR.pdf. 
 12. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No 
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a 
State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations . . . .”); In re Topps Co. 
S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 953–54 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[W]hen a corporation 
forms under the laws of a particular state, the rights of its stockholders are 
determined by that state’s law . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF 
LAWS §§ 302–10, 313 (1971) (discussing a state’s interest in regulating 
corporations established under its laws). 
 13. See Overview of the Delaware Court System, DEL. JUDICIARY, 
http://courts.delaware.gov/overview.stm (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (“The 
Supreme Court is the State’s appellate court which receives direct appeals from 
the Court of Chancery, the Superior Court, and the Family Court.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. There are a number of principled justifications, from a societal 
perspective, for preferring the judges of the state of incorporation to adjudicate 
disputes concerning a corporation’s internal affairs. Perhaps most obviously, 
doing so “promotes the consistent application of relevant doctrine . . . . That, in 
turn, promotes the growth of precedent to guide future transactions. Fostering 
that consistency and growth is the primary public interest implicated in 
corporate and contract cases, because consistency and predictability contribute 
to wealth creation.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Matthew C. 
Jennejohn, Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 4 
(Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econs. & Bus. Discussion Paper No. 740, 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200499. Thus, although 
“judiciaries throughout the United States are staffed with competent judges 
capable of producing serviceable opinions applying other jurisdiction[s’] 
laws[,] . . . doctrinal complexity means optimal applications of a jurisdiction’s 
 
DOCKET DIVIDENDS 477 
Delaware courts often adjudicate cases involving many of the 
country’s major companies and issues stemming from the latest 
developments affecting the national economy.15 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that several independent cases dealing with 
similar issues related to the financial headlines, especially those 
questions having potentially systemic ramifications, arise at any 
particular time. 
Unlike most of the issues du jour that have arisen in recent 
years, the issues that arose in 2011 and early 2012 did not invoke 
a discrete, substantive question of corporation law. Rather, the 
issues recently at the forefront relate to the growth in 
shareholder representative litigation itself.16 Five years ago, in 
2007, less than 40% of public company merger and acquisition 
(M&A) deals were challenged.17 By 2010, over 80% of those 
transactions gave rise to litigation, with each challenged 
transaction drawing an average of nearly five independently filed 
complaints.18 The preliminary data for 2011 shows that such 
                                                                                                     
law will most likely be accomplished by that jurisdiction’s courts, which are 
steeped in its traditions and nuances.” Id. at 73. 
 15. DEL. DIV. OF CORPS. ANN. REP., supra note 11, at 1. 
 16. In this Article, the terms “shareholder representative litigation” or, 
alternatively, “shareholder representative actions” or “suits,” refer to both (1) 
class actions brought directly by a corporation’s shareholders against the board 
of directors or other corporate fiduciaries challenging a merger or other 
corporate transactions, as well as (2) derivative suits brought by shareholders 
on behalf of the corporation to assert claims belonging to the corporation itself, 
such as breaches of the board’s fiduciary duties alleged to have caused a loss to 
the company. For further discussion of the distinction between direct and 
derivative actions in the corporation law context, see generally Tooley v. 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, 
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY 
§ 9.02[a] (2012) [hereinafter WOLFE & PITTENGER]. 
 17. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics 
of State Competition and Litigation 31 tbl.1 (Apr. 2012) (Working Paper), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984758. 
 18. Id. Meanwhile actual deal flow, as measured by the aggregate dollar 
amount of all transactions, increased by less than 20% during the same period. 
See Quentin Webb & Denny Thomas, M&A Tops $2.2 Trillion in First Yearly 
Rise Since 2007, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2010, 7:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2010/12/17/us-deals-idUSTRE6BG00D20101217 (last visited Feb. 6, 
2013) (noting that M&A deal activity grew, for the first time since 2007, by 
almost a fifth in 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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shareholder suits are becoming even more ubiquitous: in 2011, 
over 90% of M&A deals over $100 million were challenged.19 This 
rise in shareholder representative litigation does not pertain 
necessarily to any particular substantive area of corporation law.  
Nevertheless, it has broad implications.  The plethora of cases 
has brought into sharper focus the civil procedure of shareholder 
representative actions. The results may affect how lead plaintiffs, 
their counsel, defense counsel, and courts in multiple 
jurisdictions can best handle such litigation involving Delaware 
companies and ensure that it effectively serves the purposes for 
which representative forms of shareholder litigation were 
created. 
This Article addresses emerging issues in the civil procedure 
of shareholder representative litigation along two parallel tracks. 
First, after a brief overview of the legal basis for the Delaware 
Court of Chancery’s subject matter specialty in shareholder 
representative litigation in Part II, Part III summarizes the effect 
that the growth in shareholder representative actions has had on 
four areas of Delaware law: (1) awards of attorneys’ fees to 
plaintiffs’ counsel; (2) certification and removal of lead plaintiffs; 
(3) motions to stay or dismiss because of concurrent litigation in 
another jurisdiction; and (4) the interaction of pleading rules, 
forum shopping, and statutory books and records actions under 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) Section 220.20 
Second, the Article attempts to demonstrate how Delaware’s 
volume of corporate and alternative business entity cases and the 
responsiveness of its courts, its legislature, and the legal 
marketplace generally accelerate the development of refined 
doctrine, measured balance, and valuable predictability. In short, 
with repeat experience comes ready expertise and real 
efficiency.21  
                                                                                                     
 19. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER 




 20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2010). 
 21. See, e.g., William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570, 585–86 (describing the Court of Chancery “as an 
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II. The Importance of Shareholder Representative Litigation to the 
Substantive Law of Corporations, or a Brief History of Why the 
Court of Chancery Hears Shareholder Cases 
To apprehend the importance of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s procedural rules to Delaware’s substantive law of 
corporations, some brief background on the origins of equity 
practice may be useful. Though only an archaic concept for most 
common law jurisdictions, the distinction between “law” and 
“equity” is the historical source of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s jurisdiction to hear most corporation cases. Except 
where enlarged by statute, the Court of Chancery exercises the 
subject matter jurisdiction that the English High Court of 
Chancery possessed as of 1776.22 Legal historians often 
characterize English common law before the nineteenth century 
as insufferably rigid.23 The writ system developed inflexible rules 
of pleading and evidence that were designed poorly in the first 
place and, thereafter, rarely modified, despite the recognized 
hardships they caused.24 A stock example comes from the “use,” 
                                                                                                     
unusual and remarkably effective regulatory machine” over “a broad field of 
economic activity”). Because the Court of Chancery “sees and has the power to 
regulate a vast amount of M&A activity, its perspective is not episodic or 
narrow, but constant and, if not complete, very substantially representative.” Id. 
at 586. 
 22. See, e.g., DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 727 (Del. 1951) (“[T]he 
general equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery . . . is defined as all the 
general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it 
existed prior to the separation of the colonies . . . .”); Glanding v. Indus. Trust 
Co., 45 A.2d 553, 558–59 (Del. 1945) (“[T]he Court of Chancery shall . . . exercise 
that complete system of equity jurisdiction [that the High Court of Chancery 
possessed as of 1776] in all respects until the Legislature of this State shall 
provide otherwise.” (emphasis added)). 
 23. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 53 
(4th ed. 2002) (“[T]he formulae through which justice was centralised and 
administered by the king’s courts in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were 
frozen as part of the ‘due process of law’ guaranteed by charters of liberties, and 
gave rise to a formalistic legal culture which affected legal thought at every 
turn.”). Baker further notes that “[t]he possibilities of technical failure [under 
the common law writ system] were legion. And the growing strength of the 
substantive law could also work injustice, because the judges preferred to suffer 
hardship in individual cases than to make exceptions to clear rules.” Id. at 102. 
 24. See id. at 97 (“Although the jurisdictions were adjusted, and the 
procedures were developed, distorted or evaded in different periods, the 
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the prototype of our modern trust. In a use, A gave legal title of 
property to B for the use of C. The evidentiary rules of the 
common law, however, treated B’s legal title as any other form of 
absolute ownership.25 Thus, if B absconded with, or otherwise 
interfered with C’s use of, the property, the courts of law could 
not provide a remedy.26 Over time, the sovereign’s oath to provide 
“equal and right justice” came to recognize a royal duty to furnish 
a remedy whenever the law courts’ exercise of the crown’s judicial 
powers proved deficient.27 For that reason, the Lord High 
Chancellor, essentially a political appointee to an administrative 
department, was empowered to disregard the formalism of the 
law, including the requirement of trial by juries,28 and compel 
                                                                                                     
essential premises and outward forms of the common-law system went almost 
unchanged between the thirteenth and the nineteenth centuries.”); id. at 102–03 
(noting that the common law favored “strict rules of evidence, rules which might 
exclude the merits of the case from consideration but which could not be relaxed 
without destroying certainty or condoning carelessness”). 
 25. See id. at 248–49 (describing the historical evolution of the “use”). 
 26. Id. at 102. Another example comes from the law of debtor-creditor 
relations. English evidentiary rules treated a sealed bond as incontrovertible 
proof of the existence of an outstanding debt. Id. Hence, if the debtor repaid the 
amount borrowed but failed to request back or otherwise destroy the bond 
issued to the creditor, the creditor could proffer the bond to a court of law and 
force the debtor to pay on it again. Id. 
 27. Id. at 98 (quoting the coronation oath of Edward II in the early 
fourteenth century). 
 28. Although the absence of juries commonly is considered one of the 
distinctive features of chancery practice, there is historical evidence that 
chancellors frequently submitted questions of fact to juries, albeit by use of legal 
fictions. Blackstone, himself a chancellor, wrote that: 
[T]his court is so sensible of the deficiency of trial by written 
depositions [alone], that it . . . usually directs the matter to be tried 
by jury. . . . But, as no jury can be summoned to attend this court, the 
fact is usually directed to [a court of law] upon a feigned issue. 
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452. According to Blackstone, the 
“feigned issue” might take the form of an action at law for payment on a 
fictitious bet that, if the contested fact were true, one party owed the other a 
nominal sum; the parties would concede the existence and validity of the bet 
and contest only the decisive fact. Id. “[T]hereupon that issue is joined, which is 
directed out of chancery to be tried: and thus the verdict of the jurors at law 
determines the fact in the court of equity.” Id. 
Even today, the Delaware Court of Chancery possesses statutory authority to 
submit questions of fact to a jury. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 369 (2012). The 
Court of Chancery has interpreted this authority, however, to be “wholly 
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that which, in good conscience, ought to be done—in the above 
example, remedy B’s breach of an extralegal duty to C.29 That led 
to the recognition, and to the enforcement, of fiduciary duties, 
i.e., extralegal obligations “to act with the highest degree of 
honesty and loyalty toward another person.”30  
Because fiduciary duties are “extralegal,” their enforcement 
historically became the exclusive province of courts of chancery, 
in which chancellors administered equity instead of law.31 
Although most common law jurisdictions long ago merged law 
and equity in a single court,32 Delaware has not.33 Therefore, any 
action against a corporate director for breach of fiduciary duty 
                                                                                                     
discretionary”—with “the jury’s decision [as] merely advisory”—and “has opined 
that the procedure ‘is now probably outmoded.’” WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 
16, § 1.08 (quoting Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Park Oil, Inc., 385 A.2d 147, 151 
(Del. Ch. 1978)). 
 29. See BAKER, supra note 23, at 103 (“The Chancery worked differently. 
The chancellor was free from the rigid procedures under which such injustices 
sheltered. His court was a court of conscience, in which defendants could be 
coerced into doing whatever conscience required in the full circumstances of the 
case.”). 
 30. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009). 
 31. Chancery practice also invented procedures and remedies to redress 
other hardships tolerated by the courts of law, such as the class action 
mechanism itself (to remedy the inequity of piecemeal adjudication when joinder 
of numerous interested parties was otherwise impractical) and the equitable 
remedy of cancellation of a bond (to relieve the burdens discussed supra note 
26). See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (noting that 
Rule 23 “stems from equity practice” (citing Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work 
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375–400 (1967))); DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS HORNBOOK ON 
REMEDIES § 2.1 (1993) (discussing orders for the cancellation of instruments as 
among the remedies invented in equity practice). 
 32. New York was the first to do so upon enacting a new state constitution 
in 1846. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. XIV, §§ 5–6, available at http://www. 
nycourts.gov/history/pdf/Library/1846_constitution.pdf. Great Britain merged 
law and equity in 1875 for the superior courts via the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act 1873. BAKER, supra note 23, at 114. The United States federal 
courts did not merge law and equity until promulgation of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 1938. See Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 
1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990)) (authorizing the merger 
of law and equity); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (amended 2007) (combining actions at 
law and equity into “one form of action to be known as ‘civil action’”). 
 33. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1953) (“The Court of Chancery shall 
have jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters and causes in equity.”). 
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brought in a Delaware state court must be brought in the Court 
of Chancery rather than the Delaware Superior Court, 
Chancery’s sister court of law.34  
As a substantive matter, the law of corporations is designed 
in large part to remedy collective-action problems in commerce.35 
Capital markets permit efficient allocation of inexpensive capital 
to worthy enterprises, but also produce risks problematic for 
decentralized governance. If an enterprise has many thousands of 
dispersed owners, only a few possess the economic incentive to 
inform themselves fully of all material information before 
participating in daily business decisions.36 Corporation law 
addresses this risk by vesting control over the company’s day-to-
day affairs in a group of professional managers, who act as the 
agents of their shareholder-principals.37 Thus, for example, the 
DGCL provides that “[t]he business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors.”38 Because the board’s function is to generate 
wealth by taking reasonable, good faith risk in deploying the 
                                                                                                     
 34. The Delaware Court of Chancery’s general equitable subject matter 
jurisdiction, though often characterized as engendering a specialization in 
corporate governance matters, means that the Chancery is actually not 
exclusively a business court. See generally WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 16, 
§ 2.03 (noting the Court’s jurisdiction extends to all matters involving equitable 
rights—e.g., trusts, estates, and guardianships—as well as all requests for 
equitable relief—e.g., injunctions, specific performance, and cancellation of 
bonds). 
 35. See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils 
Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 589 n.32 (2003) (“[T]he very reason 
publically held corporations exist is to exploit the advantages of vesting control 
of the firm in professional managers who do not own the firm.” (citing CHARLES 
R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS 158 (3d ed. 1999))). 
 36. See id. at 589 (“Even sophisticated shareholders generally are not 
sufficiently informed to manage the firms they own because they own a 
relatively modest fraction of any one company and thus have neither the 
incentives to acquire nor the capacity to analyze the information needed to 
make prudent, everyday business decisions.”). 
 37. See id. at 588–90 & n.32 (“In addition to being specifically trained for 
the task and better informed about the firm, managers can make informed 
decisions free from the costly collective action problems that plague 
decentralized governance.”). 
 38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010) (emphasis added). 
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corporation’s capital, the business judgment rule insulates 
directors when they make what, in hindsight, turn out to be poor 
business decisions.39 Nothing in the DGCL, however, gives 
directors license to breach the trust they have been given. When 
a rogue director breaches his or her fiduciary duty, the Court of 
Chancery has the authority to enforce shareholders’ rights.40 And, 
in part because of the sheer number of corporations formed under 
Delaware law, the Court of Chancery’s docket often has been 
dominated by such breach of fiduciary duty cases. 
With repeat experience comes ready expertise. As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist remarked at the celebration of its 200th 
anniversary, the Court of Chancery 
has handed down thousands of opinions interpreting virtually 
every provision of Delaware’s corporate law statute. No other 
state court can make such a claim . . . . The process of decision 
in the litigated cases has so refined the law that business 
planners may usually order their affairs to avoid law suits. 
This recognition confers on the Court of Chancery one of the 
highest forms of praise the judiciary can receive.41 
As surely as Rome was built brick-by-brick, so too has Delaware 
developed its corporate jurisprudence case-by-case. Indeed, the 
volume of cases that it hears contributes importantly to this 
                                                                                                     
 39. See 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 12–18 
(5th ed. 1998) (discussing the various rationales of the business judgment rule). 
 40. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 (Del. 1996) (“Only by 
demonstrating that the Board breached its fiduciary duties may the 
presumption of the business judgment rule be rebutted . . . .”); McMahon v. New 
Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) (describing fiduciary 
relationships as among “the most ancient headings under which Chancery’s 
jurisdiction falls”). 
 41. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court, 
The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint 
Venture of Providing Justice, Address at the Bicentennial Celebration of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery (Sept. 18, 1992), in William H. Rehnquist, The 
Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint 
Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (Nov. 1992); see also Savitt, 
supra note 21, at 585 (“[T]he five Chancery judges are appointed on the basis of 
their expertise in Delaware corporate law and cannot help but become even 
more expert by virtue of their deep and continuous exposure to that law and 
their obligation to interpret and expound it daily and at length.”). 
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valuable predictability, even in a dynamic economic and capital 
marketplace.42  
To give just one small example of the organic nature of this 
process, in December 2011, Vice Chancellor Laster issued an 
opinion in In re Compellent Technologies.43 In dicta, he 
questioned the wording of a provision of a merger agreement 
requiring the target company’s board to give notice to the 
acquirer if any subsequent, superior offers arose.44 The Vice 
Chancellor did not question the general validity of this relatively 
common information rights provision, just the particular verbiage 
used to express it in the merger agreement at issue in that case.45 
Less than two months later, another case—In re Micromet46—
challenged a merger agreement containing a nearly identical 
provision, except for a revision in the language the court had 
questioned in Compellent.47 The court in Micromet found the 
revised provision unobjectionable.48 More important than the 
outcomes of those two cases, however, is what one reasonably can 
infer from their facts and sequence. Apparently, within a matter 
of weeks, transactional attorneys had read the Compellent 
opinion and advised their clients accordingly in connection with a 
later transaction that, when challenged, survived judicial 
scrutiny.49 This is a real world example of the predictability Chief 
                                                                                                     
 42. Regrettably, as expanded upon below, that does not always lead to the 
avoidance of lawsuits, especially in the M&A arena. See infra Part III.A.  
 43. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084–VCL, 2011 
WL 6382523 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011). 
 44. Id. at *7 (“The [agreement] required the Board to knowingly breach its 
fiduciary duties . . . by first requiring the Board to determine that failing to act 
constituted a breach of its fiduciary obligations and then forbidding the Board to 
act until subsequent contractual conditions were met.”). 
 45. See id. (“This last problem could have been avoided by using a pure 
Superior Offer clause, rather than a hybrid with a Superior Offer trigger and a 
fiduciary duty determination.”). 
 46. In re Micromet, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7197–VCP, 2012 WL 
681785 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012). 
 47. See id. at *8 (describing the notice provision). 
 48. Id. at *9 (“[U]nlike Compellent, the recommendation provision here 
does not restrict the Board’s ability to fulfill known fiduciary duties in a timely 
fashion. Therefore, the potential problems identified in Compellent do not exist 
here.”). 
 49. Cf. Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verret, Delaware’s Guidance: Ensuring 
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Justice Rehnquist praised and the speed with which the Court of 
Chancery provides it.50 
Similar examples of responsiveness can be seen in the 
Delaware legislature’s occasional passage of legislation to modify 
or clarify Delaware corporate or alternative entity law as 
reflected in a relatively recent decision of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery or the Delaware Supreme Court. One such instance 
relates to the corporation’s power to indemnify, and to advance 
legal fees incurred by, an individual as a result of legal 
proceedings related to that individual’s service as a director of the 
company.51 In the 2008 case of Schoon v. Troy Corp.,52 Vice 
Chancellor Lamb allowed a corporation to amend its bylaws and 
revoke a former director’s right to advancement even though the 
bylaws that were in place during his service stated that the right 
to advancement would continue after his tenure on the board 
ended.53 In early 2009, the General Assembly amended DGCL 
Section 145(f) to abrogate the holding in Schoon by precluding a 
                                                                                                     
Equity for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 189, 207 (2007) (“The 
Delaware judges have frequently crafted dicta to give valuable guidance to deal 
lawyers on unanswered questions.”). The Delaware courts “recognize the need to 
wait for a live controversy to resolve an issue definitively, but fortunately they 
also recognize that this does not mean that they cannot, or should not, use the 
attention paid to a published opinion to offer guidance on uncertain but vital 
areas of corporate law.” Id. Cf. also Savitt, supra note 21, at 588–89 (“[T]he 
Court of Chancery often announces in dictum—frank dictum, not dictum 
disguised as holding—new rules intended to influence the conduct of future 
transactions. . . . [R]ulings on important questions that provid[e] clear guidance 
to transactional lawyers on the proper way to structure corporate 
transactions.”). 
 50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also Savitt, supra note 
21, at 583–84 (“The [Court of Chancery]’s willingness to expedite review of any 
colorable claim of inadequate disclosure, coupled with the recent massive 
expansion in deal litigation, has produced a new phenomenon: the systematic 
real-time testing of merger proxies for material deficiencies by court-supervised 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.”). 
 51. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2011). 
 52. Schoon v. Troy Corp., 948 A.2d 1157 (Del. Ch. 2008), aff’d sub nom. 
Bohnen v. Troy Corp., 962 A.2d 916 (Del. 2009) (unpublished table decision).  
 53. See id. at 1165–66 (ruling that a director’s advancement rights are 
determined by the relevant provisions in the corporation’s governing 
instruments as of the filing of the action triggering the advancement 
obligations, and not as of the dates that the director took office or the alleged 
wrongdoing occurred). 
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corporation from impairing a director’s right to indemnification or 
advancement after the occurrence of the conduct that is the 
subject of the indemnification or advancement claim, unless the 
corporation’s charter or bylaws in effect at the time of the 
challenged conduct expressly authorized retroactive elimination 
or impairment.54 
Ironically, shareholder litigation also lends itself to the same 
collective-action governance problems that inhere in the 
substantive law of corporations it seeks to enforce.55 Two 
important ameliorating mechanisms are class actions on behalf of 
all affected shareholders and the derivative action, in which a 
shareholder sues not on her own behalf personally, but on behalf 
of the corporation.56 In either case, contingent fees provide 
incentives for specialized plaintiffs’ firms “to pursue monitoring 
activities that are wealth increasing for the collectivity (the 
corporation or the body of its shareholders).”57 
                                                                                                     
 54. 77 Del. Laws ch. 14, § 3 (2009) (amending DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 145(f) (1997)). 
 55. As Chancellor Allen explained, 
[a] fundamental condition of the corporate form when stockholders 
are widely dispersed . . . is that individual shareholders have little 
incentive to bear the costs associated with activities that monitor 
board of director (or management) performance . . . . While the 
conditions that allow investors to be rationally passive are a primary 
source of utility, they can also lead to inefficiency to the extent 
centralized management may have incentives that are not perfectly 
aligned with those of the residual owners of the firm, which is 
inevitably the case . . . . For that reason some expenditures for 
shareholder monitoring would be efficient. Such monitoring is, of 
course, more or less costly to the shareholder who engages in it. In a 
public company with widely distributed shares any particular 
shareholder has very little incentive to incur those costs himself in 
pursuit of a collective good, since unless there is some method to force 
a sharing of costs, he will bear all of the costs and only a (small) pro 
rata share of any gains that the monitoring yields. 
Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 402–03 (Del. Ch. 1996) (footnote omitted). 
 56. See id. at 403 (explaining that the derivative lawsuit is “[o]ne way the 
corporation law deals with this conundrum . . . through the . . . recognized 
practice of awarding to successful shareholder champions and their attorney’s 
risk-adjusted reimbursement payments (i.e., contingency based attorneys 
fees)”). 
 57. Id.  
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The Court of Chancery has broad jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning the internal affairs of Delaware corporations, and that 
includes hearing class and derivative actions regarding alleged 
breaches of fiduciary duties by a company’s directors.58 
Consequently, Delaware has a strong interest in ensuring that 
shareholder representative suits function properly and 
effectively.59 Among other things, this interest means that, unlike 
their Westminster antecedents, the Court of Chancery and the 
Delaware Supreme Court cannot blind themselves to the complex 
market dynamics that often engender and affect the shareholder 
litigation presented to them. This historical and thematic 
background leads to four specific examples, taken from cases 
decided within the last two years, of how the Court of Chancery 
advances the proper and effective functioning of shareholder 
representative litigation apace of market developments. 
III. Recent Issues in Chancery Procedure 
The foregoing is intended to introduce two propositions that 
prompted, and now frame, this Article: (1) the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s ability to respond rapidly and reliably to market 
dynamics; and (2) the Court’s institutional interest in the proper 
and effective functioning of shareholder representative litigation. 
We next examine the juridical interaction between those two 
propositions, focusing on four specific procedural issues as 
                                                                                                     
 58. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 111 (2010) (expressly granting the Court of 
Chancery subject matter jurisdiction to interpret, apply, enforce, or determine a 
number of corporate instruments as well as the provisions of the DGCL itself, 
all of which is in addition to the Court’s traditional equitable jurisdiction over 
claims of breach of fiduciary duty). 
 59. For example, Chancellor Chandler once articulated this interest as 
follows:  
It is important for shareholders to bring derivative suits because 
these suits, filed after the alleged wrongdoing, operate as an ex post 
check on corporate behavior. . . . When shareholder plaintiffs bring 
meritorious lawsuits, they deter improper behavior by similarly 
situated directors and managers, who want to avoid the expense of 
being sued and the sometimes larger reputational expense of losing 
in court. 
Seinfeld v. Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 333 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
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examples: (1) awards of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel; 
(2) certification and removal of lead plaintiffs; (3) motions to stay 
or dismiss because of concurrent litigation in another jurisdiction; 
and (4) the relationship between pleading rules, forum shopping, 
and statutory books and records actions under DGCL 
Section 220. These issues evidence collectively a broader theme: 
the Court’s development of procedural mechanisms that promote 
effective but fair use by shareholders of representative 
litigation.60 Those mechanisms should provide the optimal 
incentives for shareholders to avoid collective-action problems on 
the front-end without providing a windfall to plaintiffs’ firms on 
the back-end by enforcing rules that encourage and support the 
filing of meritorious suits.  In turn, those rules should respect a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum while maintaining Delaware’s 
legitimate interest in regulating the internal affairs of entities 
created under its laws and without causing an arbitrary race to 
the courthouse.  
A. Corporate Benefit on a Contingency Basis: Calculating 
Attorneys’ Fees 
As previously indicated, U.S. capital markets appear to have 
generated increased litigation in recent years, especially 
                                                                                                     
 60. These four examples are not intended to exhaust the ways in which the 
court’s recent decisions may impact the effective and efficient operation of 
representative litigation in the corporate context. For example, in Forsythe v. 
ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., the court recently took a novel, efficiency-promoting 
approach in approving a proposed derivative action settlement. See Forsythe v. 
ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., C.A. No. 1091-VCL, 2012 WL 1655538, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
May 9, 2012). There, the court concluded that the settlement of $13.25 million in 
cash and other concessions fell “within a range of fairness, albeit at the low 
end,” but certain objectors asserted that they could recover significantly more if 
permitted to continue prosecuting the case to trial. Id. Because the proposed 
settlement was already fair, and because “[p]assing on the current settlement to 
seek more at trial carries substantial risk,” the court decided to “approve the 
settlement unless the objectors make the equivalent of a topping bid [by] . . . 
post[ing] a secured bond or letter of credit for the benefit of [the company on 
whose behalf the claims were brought] for the full settlement consideration of 
$13.25 million,” thus permitting the objectors to continue litigating the case for 
a greater recovery while protecting the company from the risk of recovering 
nothing after a full trial on the merits. Id. 
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shareholder representative suits challenging M&A transactions. 
Preliminary data for 2011 reveals that over 90% of M&A deals 
over $100 million were challenged in court, up from less than 40% 
only five years ago in 2007.61 Some evidence suggests that this 
rise in M&A litigation can be attributed to the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act62 and Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act,63 both of which were intended to curb strike suits 
by entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ firms64 but inadvertently may have 
induced plaintiffs’ firms to bring cases predicated on state 
fiduciary duty law instead of federal securities law.65 Whatever 
the cause of this rise in M&A litigation, however, there is no 
evidence, as yet, that credibly proves that only one out of every 
ten boards that approved a merger in 2011 managed to do so 
without breaching their fiduciary duties.66 Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, most of these cases—approximately 70% of them—
settle.67 Moreover, in almost 90% of the cases, the reported 
settlement consideration that the defendant directors gave in 
exchange for the release of the shareholders’ claims was a so-
called therapeutic benefit, consisting of either supplemental 
                                                                                                     
 61. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 62. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 63. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 64.  See Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 349, 349–50 (2012) (“The PSLRA . . . was motivated by concerns 
that plaintiffs’ counsel were untrustworthy and filed frivolous lawsuits 
primarily for their own advantage . . . . [The] SLUSA . . . ensures that class 
counsel cannot avoid the PSLRA[] . . . by filing in state court.”). 
 65. See Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the 
Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 467 
(“Various firms that were pushed out of securities class actions . . . responded by 
gravitating to corporate suits.”); Johnson, supra note 64, at 384 (“M&A objection 
class actions have replaced traditional stock drop cases as the lawsuit of choice 
for plaintiffs’ securities lawyers.”). 
 66. Indeed, “the rise of supermajorities of independent directors on boards, 
the decline in structural takeover defenses, and the improvement in disclosures 
[during this period] all suggest that litigation over M&A transactions should 
have become rarer, not more frequent.” Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra 
note 14, at 16 n.46. 
 67. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 17, at 33 tbl.2. 
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disclosures or changes to the nonmonetary deal terms, but not an 
increase to the deal price offered to the shareholders.68  
We next turn from the current state of the markets to the 
state of the law. Court of Chancery Rules 23(e)69 and 23.1(c),70 
like their federal counterparts,71 require court approval before a 
class action or derivative suit may be dismissed voluntarily or 
compromised.72 These Rules are “intended to guard against 
surreptitious buy-outs of representative plaintiffs, leaving other 
class members without recourse” when the settlement, by design, 
releases their claims.73 In that approval process, the reviewing 
court performs at least three separate functions. It decides: 
(1) whether and how to certify the class; (2) whether, in the 
court’s independent business judgment, the settlement is in the 
best interest of the class; and (3) what would be a reasonable 
award of attorneys’ fees and expenses for the plaintiffs’ counsel.74 
What follows addresses only the third of those tasks. 
Where a class or derivative action settlement confers a 
benefit on the plaintiffs, either monetary or therapeutic, 
Delaware law authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees for counsel’s 
efforts in creating the benefit.75 “A court’s goal in setting a fee 
                                                                                                     
 68. Id. By contrast, from “1999 to 2000, 52% of suits filed on behalf of 
shareholders produced a financial benefit for the class, and only 10% of 
settlements were ‘disclosure-only.’” Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 
14, at 10. 
 69. DEL. CT. CH. R. 23(e). 
 70. Id. R. 23.1(c). 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); id. R. 23.1(c). 
 72. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23(e) (“[A] class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the Court . . . .”); id. R. 23.1(c) (same with 
regard to derivative actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (same); id. R. 23.1(c) (same). 
 73. Wied v. Valhi, Inc., 466 A.2d 9, 15 (Del. 1983). 
 74. See, e.g., In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304–VCP, 2012 
WL 1020471, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (detailing the various steps the 
court must take in the approval process), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, No. 212, 
2012 WL 6707736 (Del. Dec. 27, 2012). 
 75. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1164–65 (Del. 
1989). This approach to assessing attorneys’ fees in representative shareholder 
actions proceeds from a framework of analysis identified in a case referred to as 
Sugarland and involves consideration of several different factors:  
(i) the amount of time and effort applied to the case by counsel for the 
plaintiffs; (ii) the relative complexities of the litigation; (iii) the 
standing and ability of petitioning counsel; (iv) the contingent nature 
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award should be to avoid windfalls to counsel while encouraging 
future meritorious lawsuits,”76 but various problems emerge if the 
benefit is only therapeutic. First, pricing the value conferred by a 
nonmonetary settlement is an almost metaphysical exercise.77 
What is the dollar value of furnishing more information about the 
deal decision-making process? Or of the increased chance that 
relaxing a deal protection term—e.g., reducing a termination fee 
from $35 million to $30 million—will result in a superior bid? Not 
the increased value of the topping bid itself (indeed, in many 
cases there is no topping bid), but rather the therapeutic value of 
the increased likelihood that, because of counsel’s efforts, another 
bidder might emerge? To answer these questions, the court draws 
on its experience.78 
In In re Sauer-Danfoss,79 decided in early 2011, the court 
cataloged the fees awarded in numerous disclosure-only cases, 
and sorted them by the qualitative importance of the disclosures 
obtained.80 Its results revealed 
                                                                                                     
of the litigation; (v) the stage at which the litigation ended; 
(vi) whether the plaintiff can rightly receive all the credit for the 
benefit conferred or only a portion thereof; and (vii) the size of the 
benefit conferred.  
In re Plains Res. Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 071-N, 2005 WL 332811, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 2005) (citing Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 
149–50 (Del. 1980)). By far, the most important of the Sugarland factors is the 
benefit conferred by the settlement. Id. 
 76. In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 
1806616, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010), aff’d, 9 A.3d 475 (Del. 2010) 
(unpublished table decision); but see Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault (Southern 
Peru II), 51 A.3d 1213, 1263 (Del. 2012) (Berger, J., dissenting) (“The trial 
court[’s fee analysis] focused on the perceived need to incentivize plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to take cases to trial. . . . The trial court opined that a declining 
percentage for ‘mega’ cases would not create a healthy incentive system. . . . 
That is not a decision based on Sugarland.”). 
 77. See Dias v. Purches, C.A. No. 7199-VCG, 2012 WL 4503174, at *6 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 1, 2012) (“The size of the benefit conferred by a [nonmonetary benefit] 
is inherently incapable of direct calculation . . . .”). 
 78. See, e.g., id. (“In light of this problem, [the Delaware Court of 
Chancery] attempts to at least achieve consistency, looking at prior decisions to 
guide future ones.”). 
 79. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 5162–VCL, 2011 WL 
2519210 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011).  
 80. Id. at apps. A–C. 
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a range of discretionary awards with concentrations at certain 
levels. This Court has often awarded fees of approximately 
$400,000 to $500,000 for one or two meaningful disclosures, 
such as previously withheld projections or undisclosed conflicts 
faced by fiduciaries or their advisors. Disclosures of 
questionable quality have yielded much lower awards [in the 
range of $75,000 to $200,000]. Higher awards have been 
reserved for plaintiffs who obtained particularly significant or 
exceptional disclosures.81  
This is not to say the Court of Chancery applies “a strict formula” 
in these types of cases.82 Rather, Sauer-Danfoss attempts to 
streamline the Court’s efforts to “promote[] fairness by treating 
like cases alike and rewarding similarly situated plaintiffs 
equally.”83 In that regard, Sauer-Danfoss exemplifies how 
valuable extensive serial cases involving similar issues really are: 
both the courts and litigants involved in the review of disclosure-
only settlements now often begin with the three “levels” identified 
in Sauer-Danfoss and then ratchet up or down the ultimate 
award given (by the courts) or argued for (by the parties) 
depending on the quality of the disclosures obtained in the 
particular case. Thus, without aspiring to mathematical 
precision, taking advantage of the wealth of Chancery precedent 
can help “anchor this Court’s discretionary fee determinations to 
something more objective than the boldness of the plaintiffs’ ask 
and the vigor or passivity of the defendants’ response.”84 
Finally, and more by way of a “reality check,” the reviewing 
court compares the size of the fee award to the number of hours 
the attorneys actually worked, derives an effective hourly rate 
based on the fee arrived at by the court, and compares that to the 
amount that would have resulted from the normal hourly rate of 
the plaintiffs’ counsel, sometimes referred to as the “lodestar.”85 
                                                                                                     
 81. Id. at *18, apps. A–C. Sauer-Danfoss is one of the only opinions the 
Court of Chancery has issued with appendixes of empirical analysis.  
 82. Chancellor Allen actually advised against such an approach. In re 
Maxxam Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 8636, 1987 WL 10016, at *11 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 16, 1987). 
 83. In re Sauer-Danfoss, 2011 WL 2519210, at *17. 
 84. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084–VCL, 2011 
WL 6382523, at *20 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011). 
 85. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 5162–VCL, 2011 WL 
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In determining an appropriate fee, the lodestar is of only 
secondary importance, at best.86 Still, the reason for considering 
it is the generally contingent nature of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s 
involvement—the need to provide appropriate incentives to take 
meritorious cases that recognize risk and avoid windfalls.87 
The fact that plaintiffs’ firms usually take their cases on a 
contingency basis presents another challenge in determining the 
appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees in settlement of 
representative shareholder litigation. In contingent fee cases, it 
serves the shareholders’ interest for the Court of Chancery to 
provide the right incentives to prosecute meritorious claims.88 
Hence, when parties settle early, courts tend to award attorneys 
a lower percentage of the benefit conferred than in cases where 
settlement occurs later in the process, usually in the range of 
                                                                                                     
2519210, at *20 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011) (“The time and effort expended by 
counsel serves a cross-check on the reasonableness of a fee award.” (citing 
Brinckerhoff v. Tex. E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 396 (Del. Ch. 2010)). 
 86. See id. (“The time (i.e., hours) that counsel claim to have worked is of 
secondary importance.”); accord Southern Peru II, 51 A.3d 1213, 1254 (Del. 
2012) (“Delaware courts are not required to award fees based on hourly rates 
that may not be commensurate with the value of the common fund created by 
the attorneys’ efforts.”). 
 87. As noted in one Chancery opinion, 
Fee awards should encourage future meritorious lawsuits by 
compensating the plaintiffs’ attorneys for their lost opportunity cost 
(typically their hourly rate), the risks associated with the litigation, 
and a premium. The fee award, however, can reach a point where it 
no longer operates as an incentive, and rather morphs into a “socially 
unwholesome windfall.” 
Franklin Balance Sheet Inv. Fund v. Crowley, C.A. No. 888-VCP, 2007 WL 
2495018, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2007) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Seinfeld v. 
Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 334 (Del. Ch. 2000)). In this context, “risk” means “the risk 
of losing the case outright, something that every plaintiff must bear. Risk 
reflects the contingent nature of the work, the financing costs incurred with 
delaying the attorneys’ compensation until the case is concluded, the inability to 
diversify away particular risks, as well as other contingencies.” Seinfeld, 847 
A.2d at 334 n.11. 
 88. In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 
1806616, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010), aff’d, 9 A.3d 475 (Del. 2010) 
(unpublished table decision); cf. also Seinfeld, 847 A.2d at 333–34 (“It is equally 
important, however, for plaintiffs to prosecute these lawsuits efficiently. . . . 
Attorneys should not be encouraged to churn when they can receive a 
substantial premium in return for a successful result at an early stage of the 
litigation.”). 
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10%–15% of the settlement value for early settlements compared 
to as much as 35% of a post-trial judgment.89 Thus, if the benefit 
is big, so too is the proportional fee award, especially when the 
plaintiffs’ counsel have vigorously pursued the plaintiffs’ claim. 
Chancellor Strine recently made this unmistakably clear in In re 
Southern Peru Copper Corp.90 In October 2011, he issued a post-
trial opinion ruling that the shareholder class was entitled to 
recover damages, including prejudgment interest, of about $2 
billion.91 In December 2011, he awarded plaintiffs’ counsel’s 
attorneys’ fees equal to 15% of the over $2 billion judgment, or 
over $300 million, equating to an effective rate in the range of 
$35,000 per hour.92 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed that fee, reiterating that the benefit achieved by the 
litigation is the “first and most important” factor for a court to 
consider in determining a discretionary fee award.93 The 
Delaware Supreme Court recognized that, although a trial court 
has discretion to decrease the applicable percentage as the size of 
the benefit increases, “the use of a declining percentage . . . is not 
required per se.”94 Recent precedents like Southern Peru make 
clear that there is enormous upside potential to zealous advocacy 
of shareholders’ rights—assuming, of course, that the plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                     
 89. In re Emerson Radio S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 3392–VCL, 
2011 WL 1135006, at *3–4 (“Awarding increasing percentages helps offset 
representative counsel’s natural incentive to shirk.”). 
 90. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. 
Ch. 2011), aff’d, Southern Peru II, 51 A.3d 1213. 
 91. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 961-CS, 
2011 WL 6382006, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2011), aff’d, Southern Peru II, 51 
A.3d 1213. 
 92. Id. (awarding $304,742,604.45 in attorneys’ fees). Plaintiffs’ counsel 
represented that they had worked a total of 8,597 hours on the case. Plaintiff’s 
Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 9, In re S. Peru Copper Corp., 2011 
WL 6382006 (C.A. No. 961), 2011 WL 5240160. Based on those two figures, the 
implied hourly rate of the fee award is $35,477.55. 
 93. Southern Peru II, 51 A.3d 1213, 1255 (Del. 2012). 
 94. Id. at 1258; see also id. at 1261 (“[W]e decline to impose either a cap or 
the mandatory use of any particular range of percentages for determining 
attorneys’ fees in megafund cases.”). Of course, to say that a declining balance 
“is not required per se” in megafund cases still permits reasonable minds to 
disagree about whether a declining percentage is appropriate, or whether 
counsel rightly deserves a fee in such an amount, in any particular case.  
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claim is meritorious and the harm caused by the defendants’ 
misconduct is extreme, as occurred in Southern Peru. 
What about the downside? Suppose a plaintiff challenges a 
deal, engages in some expedited discovery, settles early for a “low 
quality” supplemental disclosure, and then the plaintiff’s 
attorneys are able to recoup their billable hours at normal rates. 
Such a system of unlimited upside potential with no downside 
risk would be unacceptable.95 It would provide incentives for an 
unwholesome, surreptitious kind of claim that is inimical to the 
Court of Chancery’s institutional interests in fostering the 
development and enforcement of a robust and effective body of 
corporation law.96 From a cynic’s perspective, that means 
“frequent-filers” who half-heartedly poke around in some 
expedited discovery, abandon their preliminary injunction 
motion, and grab quickly for the low-hanging fruit—e.g., a 
supplemental disclosure or two—still could recoup their time and 
hope to “hit it big” the next time.  
While encouraging zealous advocacy of meritorious claims by 
fee awards such as in Southern Peru, the Court of Chancery also 
remains vigilant to avoid awarding improper windfalls or 
                                                                                                     
 95. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 959 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“[A] systemic problem emerges when entrepreneurial litigators pursue a 
strategy of filing a large number of actions, investing relatively little time or 
energy in any single case, and settling the cases early to minimize case-specific 
investment and maximize net profit.”); ANDREW J. PINCUS, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, THE TRIAL LAWYERS’ NEW MERGER TAX: CORPORATE MERGERS AND 
THE MEGA MILLION-DOLLAR LITIGATION TOLL ON OUR ECONOMY 1 (2012) 
(characterizing awards of attorneys’ fees for therapeutic-only settlements as 
“extortion through litigation” and a “litigation tax”). 
 96. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 961 n.38 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (“Absent the rational sifting out of non-meritorious cases, stockholders 
suffer as the costs of litigation exact an undue toll on the procession of 
transactions valuable to stockholders and cause a harmful diminution in 
wealth-generating risk-taking by directors.”); Seinfeld v. Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 
334 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that fee awards larger than necessary to incentivize 
the bringing of meritorious suits “serv[es] no other purpose than to siphon 
money away from stockholders and into the hands of their agents”); Strine, 
Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 14, at 5 (“There is strong evidence of 
excess agency costs in the results of recent corporate representative litigation. 
Unless a consistent incentive system can be implemented that encourages 
representative litigation that benefits stockholders, the representative litigation 
system may on balance hurt investors more than it protects them.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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rewarding defendants’ complacency, which have the potential to 
be equally problematic. Furthermore, given the volume of 
stockholder actions that the Court of Chancery adjudicates, it has 
the ability to speak as loudly in several less-publicized cases as it 
can in any one highly publicized case. For example, in contrast to 
Southern Peru, the transcript ruling approving a settlement and 
awarding attorneys’ fees in In re Inspire Pharmaceuticals97 
attracted relatively modest attention. There, plaintiffs’ counsel 
requested $500,000 for (as determined by the reviewing court) a 
handful of questionable, agreed-to supplemental disclosures.98 
The defendants, who would have to pay that fee, did not contest 
it,99 apparently believing, to quote Dickens, that the “issue is only 
a question of costs, a mere bud on the forest tree of the parent 
suit.”100 But that “bud” arguably should have gone to the 
shareholders as deal consideration.  More broadly, the costs of 
expected, perhaps even inevitable,101 deal litigation against 
directors should not be shoehorned into a transaction intended to 
maximize shareholder value.102 Therefore, consistent with its 
                                                                                                     
 97. In re Inspire Pharms. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6378-VCP, 2012 WL 
275115 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2012) (ruling based on transcript). In fact, transcript 
rulings are more the norm than the exception with settlement hearings. 
 98. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Final Approval of Settlement and 
Application for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 
10, Inspire Pharms., 2012 WL 275115 (C.A. No. 6378-VCP), 2012 WL 160987, at 
pt. III. 
 99. See Affidavit of James P. McEvilly, III, Esquire, in Support of Final 
Approval of Settlement and Application for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and 
Reimbursement of Expenses at ¶ 42, In re Inspire Pharms., 2012 WL 275115 
(C.A. No. 6378-VCP), 2012 WL 160984 [hereinafter McEvilly Affidavit] 
(swearing that the defendant agreed not to contest the award of attorneys’ fees 
totaling $500,000). 
 100. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 1966) (1853). 
 101. For a discussion of this inevitability, see supra notes 67–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 102. Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 183–84 (Del. 1986) (holding corporate directors’ fiduciary duties when 
negotiating a change-of-control transaction require them to attempt in good 
faith to obtain the best sales price reasonably available for their shareholders), 
with Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 14, at 20 (“[I]f the defendants 
believe that the transaction is good for stockholders, as they should if they are 
directors recommending the transaction, then settling cases that are an obstacle 
to the transaction in a cost-effective way is a proper fiduciary act.”). In any 
event, regardless of whether the intentional pricing of attorneys’ fees to settle 
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responsibilities,103 the Inspire Pharmaceuticals court 
independently examined the therapeutic benefit achieved in light 
of the numerous cases in Delaware evaluating supplemental 
disclosures and reduced the fee from the $500,000 requested to 
$300,000.104  
Inspire Pharmaceuticals, where requested attorneys’ fees 
were reduced, is not unusual.105 Rather, it reflects a particular 
instance of the procedure the Court of Chancery consistently 
employs. Aware of the risks of windfalls or complacent litigants, 
the Court also is mindful of another significant risk of any 
settlement of a representative action: the possibility that valuable 
claims will be released for materially less than they are worth.106 
Accordingly, the Court of Chancery vigilantly examines the 
merits of every settlement of a representative action, whether 
objected to or not, to determine whether, in the exercise of the 
reviewing court’s independent business judgment, the settlement 
is in the shareholders’ interest.107 The court also reviews carefully 
                                                                                                     
perceived strike suits into the overall transaction price is consistent with 
directors’ fiduciary duties, the fact remains that “the corporations involved in 
the merger, and therefore their investors, bear those costs. Thus, those costs 
contribute to an increase in the costs of capital, and a net negative societal 
impact.” Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 14, at 19. 
 103. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the reviewing 
court’s function in the approval of settlements of class action and derivative 
suits).  
 104. In re Inspire Pharms. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6378-VCP, 2012 WL 
275115, at ¶ 12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2012). Even then, however, the effective 
hourly rate was about $650. McEvilly Affidavit, supra note 99, at ¶ 47 (swearing 
that the plaintiffs’ counsel “have expended more than 465 hours prosecuting the 
Action and incurred approximately $12,694.55 in expenses”). 
 105. See, e.g., Dias v. Purches, C.A. No. 7199-VCG, 2012 WL 4503174, at *6–
7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2012). 
 106. See Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and 
Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 71 (2004) (“The class 
attorney’s egoistic incentive is to maximize his or her fees—awarded by the 
court if the action succeeds—with a minimized time-and-effort investment. This 
objective does not align with a both zealous and time-consuming prosecution of 
the class action, aimed at maximizing the amount of recovery . . . .”). 
 107. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Del. 1989) 
(“The Court of Chancery plays a special role when asked to approve the 
settlement of a class or derivative action. It must balance the policy preference 
for settlement against the need to insure that the interests of the class have 
been fairly represented.”). 
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the related applications for attorneys’ fees. If plaintiffs’ counsel 
are overcompensated for settlements in which the claimed 
therapeutic benefits are relatively meager, that might increase 
the risk that meritorious claims will be settled too cheaply.108 
Cases like Inspire Pharmaceuticals exemplify the Court of 
Chancery’s continuing efforts to achieve the appropriate balance 
of incentives.  
Contrary to views expressed in recent articles in even the 
popular press,109 the argument that plaintiffs’ firms face no 
downside risk when pursuing a shareholder representative action 
on a contingency is overstated. Not every transactional case is 
put on a fast track. To receive expedited discovery and hearings, 
plaintiffs must “justify imposing on the defendants and the public 
the extra (and sometimes substantial) costs” of expedition.110 
Increasingly, defendants are opposing motions to expedite, a fact 
reflected in leading treatises and empirical data alike.111 
Although Delaware courts “traditionally ha[ve] acted with a 
certain solicitude for plaintiffs” challenging a fast-moving deal 
                                                                                                     
 108. See Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., C.A. No. 1091-VCL, 2012 WL 
1655538, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2012) (“Because of these incentives, counsel may 
favor (consciously or not) a bird-in-the-hand settlement over the continuing and 
costly quest for an uncertain outcome.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits Yield 
High Costs and Questionable Benefits, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 8, 2012, 
10:38 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/merger-lawsuits-yield-high-
costs-and-questionable-benefits/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (pointing out the 
costs of litigation for companies and shareholders and questioning “whether the 
rising cost of merger litigation requires legal reform”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Ann Woolner, Phil Milford & Rodney Yap, 
When Merger Suits Enrich Only Lawyers, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 16, 2012, 1:59 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-invest 
or-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) 
(“Of 57 . . . investor class actions settled or otherwise concluded there in 2010 
and 2011, 40—or 70 percent—made money for plaintiffs’ lawyers but not clients, 
according to data compiled by Bloomberg News.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also PINCUS, supra note 95. 
 110. Giammargo v. Snapple Beverage Corp., C.A. No. 13845, 1994 WL 
672698, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 1994). 
 111. See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 16, § 10.07[a] (observing that 
motions to expedite “ha[ve] become an early and sometimes dispositive 
battleground on the merits of the [preliminary injunction] application itself”); 
see also infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing limited empirical 
review conducted by the authors). 
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and, therefore, prefer to “err[] on the side of more hearings rather 
than fewer,” plaintiffs still must carry the burden of articulating 
a colorable claim and demonstrating that they are likely to suffer 
irreparable injury if expedited treatment is not granted.112  
A significant number of motions to expedite have been denied 
in recent years.113 Plaintiffs unable to articulate a claim that need 
be merely “colorable” to survive a motion to expedite later tend to 
face a serious risk of being unable to plead allegations entitling 
the plaintiffs to relief under any “conceivable” set of facts—i.e., to 
survive a motion to dismiss.114 Furthermore, plaintiffs effectively 
lose the ability to settle their claims in exchange for therapeutic 
changes to the deal terms or supplemental disclosures if the 
challenged transaction closes before the plaintiffs can take and 
receive discovery and brief a preliminary injunction motion 
within the timeframe contemplated by the Court’s usual, 
nonexpedited rules. In cases where a motion to expedite has been 
denied, therefore, it may be more difficult for the plaintiffs to 
achieve a meaningful settlement and reap the attendant 
premium attorneys’ fees. Indeed, the plaintiffs may not obtain 
any attorneys’ fees at all. Stated differently, cases that proceed 
with expedited discovery and briefing toward a preliminary 
                                                                                                     
 112. Giammargo, 1994 WL 672698, at *2. 
 113. For example, in an admittedly small sample of all class action or 
derivative complaints in some way related to M&A transactions filed in the 
Court of Chancery between January 1, 2011 and June 30, 2012, the authors 
observed that the plaintiffs filed motions to expedite approximately 50% of the 
time. Of those motions, defendants challenged approximately 28% (i.e., there 
were 27 challenges of 98 total motions to expedite). While several motions 
subsequently were withdrawn by the parties or mooted by further case 
developments, the Court denied at least 14 motions to expedite, one of which 
was uncontested, during the observation period. That is, excluding the outlier 
uncontested motion just mentioned, almost half of the contested motions to 
expedite were denied (i.e., 13 / 27 = 0.481).  
 114. See Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 
27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011) (observing that “[t]he pleading standards governing 
the motion to dismiss stage of a proceeding in Delaware . . . are minimal,” and 
instructing trial courts to “deny the motion unless the plaintiff could not recover 
under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof”). See 
also, e.g., In re Alloy, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 5626-VCP, 2011 WL 4863716, 
at *1, *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss in a case where the 
court earlier had denied a motion to expedite for failure to articulate a colorable 
disclosure claim). 
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injunction hearing often are those that already have survived at 
least one, albeit not especially rigorous, substantive challenge. 
Hence, the motion to expedite mechanism also operates so as to 
subdivide shareholder representative cases into at least three 
general categories: (1) the wholly meritless, for which plaintiffs’ 
counsel probably will receive no fee at all; (2) the colorable, for 
which counsel may receive some compensation in the form of an 
ordinary, hourly rate for raising issues that are readily remedied 
and that, perhaps with the benefit of discovery, will unearth a 
more substantive claim; and (3) the clearly meritorious, for which 
counsel have every incentive to prosecute zealously to trial, if 
necessary.115 In this way, the Court of Chancery’s procedural 
rules help screen out pure “strike suits” but still encourage 
plaintiffs’ firms to satisfy the watchdog function on which the 
enforcement of corporation law often depends.116 
                                                                                                     
 115. In arguing that the possibility of denial at the motion to expedite stage 
represents downside risk for plaintiffs’ counsel, we are mindful that motions to 
expedite generally are filed relatively early in the litigation. Therefore, counsel 
might not yet have invested significant time or other resources in the case, and 
would have little at risk. Nevertheless, we also appreciate that “more than half 
of all merger lawsuits settled in 2010 and 2011 were resolved within two months 
of the filing date” and “[o]nly 15% of lawsuits lasted longer than 100 days before 
settlement.” PINCUS, supra note 95, at 4 (emphasis omitted) (citing 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 3). Furthermore, Chancery judges 
generally are “willing to award substantial attorneys’ fees, even after a 
relatively quick settlement of the case, [so] that our fee awards are not 
structured to reward lawyers for needlessly prolonging litigation.” Seinfeld v. 
Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 333 (Del. Ch. 2000). In this fast-paced environment, 
therefore, the relatively early stage of the motion to expedite ruling is less 
relevant than one reasonably might suppose to estimating the investment 
plaintiffs’ counsel has made in the case. 
 116. Some scholars have argued that the Court of Chancery’s scrutiny of the 
fees requested by plaintiffs’ counsel contributes, at least in part, to the growing 
trend of cases being filed by plaintiffs in courts outside of Delaware. See, e.g., 
John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 
IND. L.J. 1345, 1370–72 (2012). For example, although Delaware might be an 
attractive forum in which to bring a truly meritorious case, the Court’s ability to 
identify weak cases relatively early arguably encourages plaintiffs’ firms “to 
bring weak suits in which the only real goal is a quick settlement for fees 
elsewhere.” Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 14, at 18 n.49. Hence, 
the Court’s “continuing efforts to achieve the appropriate balance of incentives” 
as to any procedural mechanism, Armour, Black & Cheffins, supra note 116, at 
1372, necessarily is a multifaceted endeavor in that, for example, “simply 
cutting fees, denying motions to expedite, and motions to dismiss claims are 
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B. Agents v. Agents: The Fiduciary Duties of Those Who Allege 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
The certification of a class and the occasional disqualification 
of lead plaintiffs as the class representatives is another subject 
that has received recent attention. Over the last several decades, 
the identity of lead plaintiffs in shareholder representative 
actions—and, indeed, the shareholder profile of corporate 
America117—has shifted away from individuals to institutions. 
One anecdotal example is that the Delaware cases reported from 
the 1980s and 1990s frequently were captioned “Kahn,” 
“Weinberger,” or another individual’s last name versus the 
defendant company. Today (assuming the case does not receive a 
consolidated “In re” caption because of multiple complaints), the 
caption is more likely to begin with CalPERS, LAMPERS, or 
some other institutional investor’s name. Constitutional due 
process requires that lead plaintiffs adequately represent the 
interests of the shareholder class that they purport to 
represent.118 In shareholder representative actions, this 
requirement takes on a what’s-good-for-the-goose-is-good-for-the-
gander quality. That is, by filing a complaint alleging breach of 
fiduciary duty against the directors of a Delaware corporation, 
                                                                                                     
likely to have little impact on the current [multi-jurisdictional litigation] 
problems” addressed infra Part III.C, Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra 
note 14, at 18 n.49. 
 117. “By 1979, institutional investors as a group owned over 36% [of all 
outstanding corporate equities in the United States]. Today, institutional 
investors, including public and private pension and retirement funds, mutual 
funds, and hedge funds, control nearly 70%.” Justice Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient 
Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1645, 1650 (2011) (footnote omitted) (citing John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs & 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and 
Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 240 
(2011); Leo E Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We 
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful 
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (2010)). 
 118. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“[T]he Due 
Process Clause . . . requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately 
represent the interests of the absent class members.”); see also In re MCA, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 785 A.2d 625, 635 (Del. 2001); Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 
915, 923 (Del. 1994); Leon N. Weiner & Assocs. v. Krapf, 584 A.2d 1220, 1225 
(Del. 1991); Geller v. Tabas, 462 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Del. 1983). 
502 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 473 (2013) 
the stockholder-plaintiff “voluntarily assumes the role of 
fiduciary for the class.”119  
The shift from individual to institutional shareholders, in 
turn, has increased the number of institutions assuming fiduciary 
duties on behalf of similarly situated shareholders. Because 
decentralized decision-making can be difficult, it may be easier 
for an individual to comply with fiduciary duties than for an 
institution. An institution acts only through its human agents. 
For the institution as a whole to act, or refrain from acting, in a 
certain way, each person in the decision-making network must 
participate, increasing the potential for breakdown in the lines of 
communication and honest mistakes. Even an honest mistake, 
however, can cause the institution to act in ways that may 
constitute inadequate representation. Accordingly, where 
adequacy of representation is challenged, deciding whether an 
institutional lead plaintiff, in fact, has breached its duties to the 
class requires in-depth analysis. The following two cases, issued 
within a few months of each other, make this point. 
The first case, Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson,120 illustrates 
how straightforward the analysis can be where the lead plaintiffs 
are individuals. Steinhardt, among other plaintiffs, brought a 
class action on behalf of the shareholders of Occam Networks, 
Inc., challenging, and moving to enjoin, Occam’s then-pending 
acquisition by Calix, Inc. In pursuing a preliminary injunction, 
“Steinhardt admittedly had been receiving regular written and 
oral updates about the litigation”121 based on “[i]nformation 
gleaned from Confidential Discovery Material and counsel’s 
[nonpublic] litigation assessments.”122 The court later enjoined 
the transaction for two weeks so shareholders could consider 
corrective disclosures.123 With the benefit of that nonpublic 
information, which he received as a fiduciary for the class, 
Steinhardt was able “to conclude that the Merger would be 
                                                                                                     
 119. Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, C.A. No. 5878-VCL, 2012 WL 29340, 
at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at *5. 
 122. Id. at *9. 
 123. Id. at *6. 
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consummated with no change in price.”124 To benefit himself 
individually,  
Steinhardt sold Calix short as a way to exit his Occam 
position. . . . He intended to (and later did) use the shares of 
Calix stock he would receive when the Merger closed to cover 
his short sales, even though Steinhardt and his co-plaintiffs 
were asking the Court to enjoin the closing of the Merger.125  
Thus, Steinhardt “both liquidate[d] his Occam position and [took] 
advantage of the arbitrage spread that existed between Calix and 
Occam at that time.”126 
In Delaware, as elsewhere, use of confidential information by 
an agent for personal gain constitutes a breach of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty.127 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court of 
Chancery granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions against 
Steinhardt, stating: 
Consistent with prior rulings by this Court when confronted 
with representative plaintiffs who have traded while serving 
in a fiduciary capacity, Steinhardt and the funds [he managed] 
are dismissed from the case with prejudice, barred from 
receiving any recovery from the litigation, required to self-
report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, directed to 
disclose their improper trading in any future application to 
serve as lead plaintiff, and ordered to disgorge profits in the 
amount of $534,071.45.128 
Although that statement could be read to mean that trading by a 
lead plaintiff is a per se breach of duty, the next case we discuss 
interpreted Steinhardt to be more dependent on its facts. 
                                                                                                     
 124. Id. at *10. 
 125. Id. at *4. 
 126. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (2006) (“An agent has a 
duty not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the 
agent’s own purposes or those of a third party.”). 
 128. Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, C.A. No. 5878-VCL, 2012 WL 29340, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012). The court ordered that the disgorged profits be 
distributed to the class, either immediately or “held in escrow . . . and allocated 
as part of any future remedy.” Id. at *15. The court, however, expressly declined 
“to award the disgorged funds to Calix as a proxy for the class” because Calix’s 
shareholder base includes investors who never held Occam stock before the 
challenged merger. Id. 
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In In re Celera Corp. Shareholders Litigation,129 the lead 
plaintiff, the New Orleans Employees’ Retirement System 
(NOERS), challenged Quest Diagnostics’ takeover of Celera.130 On 
the eve of the preliminary injunction hearing, NOERS settled for 
supplemental disclosures and modifications to the merger 
agreement’s deal protection provisions.131 As with all 
representative litigation, that settlement was conditioned on 
confirmatory discovery—if NOERS discovered evidence before the 
final settlement hearing that suggested its claims were stronger 
than NOERS had realized, it could rescind the settlement and 
litigate post-closing damages.132 Importantly, because of how the 
deal was structured, there ultimately was a four-day period 
during which Quest’s acquisition of Celera had become an 
absolute certainty, yet Celera’s stock continued to trade on the 
secondary market at around $8.05, five cents more than the 
merger price.133 “[A]fter all material information regarding the 
lawsuit, settlement, and transaction were disclosed to the 
marketplace,” NOERS’s investment advisor saw “a risk-free 
arbitrage opportunity” and sold all of its Celera shares at $8.05 
before the transaction officially closed.134 For that and other 
reasons, however, Celera’s largest shareholder objected to the 
                                                                                                     
 129. In re Celera Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 
1020471 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, No. 212, 2012 
WL 6707736 (Del. Dec. 27, 2012).  
 130. Id. at *1. 
 131. Id. at *6–7. 
 132. Id. at *7. 
 133. Id. Specifically, the deal “was structured in two tiers of, first, a tender 
offer by Quest for any and all Celera shares at $8.00 per share and, second, a 
back-end squeeze-out merger at the same price . . . .” Id. at *1. Moreover, Celera 
had granted Quest a so-called top-up option, effectively permitting the back-end 
squeeze-out merger to close quickly and without a shareholder vote pursuant to 
DGCL Section 253. Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2010) (allowing 
mergers without a shareholder vote if the other merging entity owns at least 
90% of the corporation’s outstanding stock entitled to vote). The four-day 
window mentioned above reflected the time between when Quest publicly 
announced the success of the front-end tender offer and its intent to exercise the 
top-up option and when it had taken all the necessary formalities to exercise the 
top-up option and effect a short-form merger under Section 253. In re Celera, 
2012 WL 1020471, at *1. For more on top-up options, see Olson v. EV3, Inc., C.A. 
No. 5583–VCL, 2011 WL 704409, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2011). 
 134. In re Celera, 2012 WL 1020471, at *15 (footnote omitted).  
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settlement, claiming that NOERS no longer had standing to 
recover monetary damages, therefore lacked any incentive to 
perform adequate confirmatory discovery, and essentially had 
abandoned the class in breach of its fiduciary duties.135 Moreover, 
between the settlement hearing and the date the opinion was 
issued, the objector advised the court of no less than three other 
cases involving similar issues where institutional investors had 
served as lead plaintiffs.136  
The Celera court drew on a wealth of precedent—including 
cases from the 2000s, 1990s, and even the 1930s—in identifying 
why certain conduct is or is not consistent with a lead plaintiff’s 
fiduciary duties to the class.137 After discussing those precedents, 
the court concluded that NOERS’s decision to sell all of its Celera 
stock arguably was “careless and cavalier” because of “the 
significant waste of the Court’s and the parties’ resources caused 
by th[e] unnecessary side issue.”138 Nonetheless, the court 
concluded that NOERS’s decision was neither analogous to 
Steinhardt nor indicative of insider trading or obvious disloyalty: 
“notwithstanding its questionable conduct, NOERS still satisfies, 
if only barely, the requirement for an appropriate class 
representative,” the court wrote.139 On that basis, the court 
certified the class with NOERS as the lead plaintiff,140 a finding 
that the Supreme Court upheld on appeal.141 In its opinion in 
Celera, however, the Court of Chancery underscored that  
the frequency with which Delaware courts have had to address 
the conduct of lead plaintiffs in recent months is troubling. 
                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at *1. 
 136. See id. at *15 (noting that the objecting shareholder cited three 
recently-decided cases to support its arguments). 
 137. See id. at *9–16 (citing a variety of cases in analyzing adequacy and 
typicality under Court of Chancery Rule 23(a)). 
 138. Id. at *1. 
 139.  Id. at *16; see also id. at *15–16 (distinguishing the three cases cited by 
the objector). 
 140. Id. at *20 (certifying the class with NOERS as the lead plaintiff). 
 141. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 212, 2012 WL 6707736, at *7-10 
(Del. Dec. 27, 2012). The Supreme Court reversed, however, on a narrower 
issue, ruling that individual class members deserved the right to opt out of the 
settlement if they wished because of “due process concerns” stemming from, 
among other things, NOERS’s bare adequacy to represent the class. Id. at *13. 
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When a class representative purports to object on behalf of 
itself and all others similarly situated only to decide later that 
the objected-to conduct may not have been all that bad, that 
representative is prone to appear more concerned about its 
own interests than those of the class. That appearance 
undermines the trust shareholders place in lead plaintiffs and, 
in turn, effaces courts’ confidence in the adequacy of the 
representation that a lead plaintiff is capable of providing. . . . 
Lead plaintiffs must remain committed to fulfilling their 
obligations to those they represent throughout the litigation. 
Among other things, that should include thinking about more 
than the technical permissibility of their conduct, but also how 
their conduct is likely to be perceived. Here, NOERS 
engendered a host of legitimate criticisms to its commitment to 
this case by choosing to take advantage of a “risk-free 
arbitrage” opportunity. Technically permissible or not, that 
choice failed to reflect an appropriate level of regard and 
respect for NOERS’s position as a fiduciary for the class.142 
Suffice it to say that Delaware courts expect representative or 
lead plaintiffs to take seriously their fiduciary responsibilities to 
the class of shareholders or company (in a derivative action) they 
represent and to exercise appropriate care to meet those 
obligations. Those same requirements apply equally to 
institutional investors that undertake to represent a class or 
company.  
C. Hercules and the Hydra: The Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation 
Problem 
Growth in deal litigation has led in turn to an increase in the 
number of jurisdictions where any particular transaction is 
challenged. For example, over half of the shareholder class 
actions against Delaware corporations in 2010 were filed in both 
Delaware and at least one other jurisdiction.143 By comparison, 
multi-jurisdictional litigation occurred in only 8.6% of litigated 
                                                                                                     
 142. In re Celera Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 
1020471, at *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012).  
 143. Johnson, supra note 64, at 39. 
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M&A transactions in 2005.144 As even prominent plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have commented: 
An all-too-familiar pattern emerges following the 
announcement of the acquisition of a Delaware corporation. 
Some of the plaintiffs’ bar will race to file a class-action 
lawsuit in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Other plaintiffs’ 
lawyers will race to a courthouse in the state of the target’s 
headquarters. A third set of firms will file “tag-along” actions 
in federal court asserting the same state law claims as the 
other plaintiffs, but incorporating a proxy claim under Section 
14A of the Securities Exchange Act as a basis for the federal 
court’s jurisdiction. The result is parallel litigation that wastes 
judicial resources, burdens defendants, and, most importantly, 
threatens shareholders.145  
By forcing director-defendants to combat essentially the same 
adversary with many heads—as Hercules did with the Hydra146—
multi-jurisdictional shareholder litigation imposes additional 
burdens on, and amplifies various risks for, all parties involved. 
For example, “defense counsel are acutely aware [of] which 
plaintiffs’ counsel are ‘pilgrims’ (i.e., early and easy settlers).”147 
Permitting defendants to negotiate global releases of all the 
pending cases with the most supine plaintiffs’ firm harms 
shareholders.148 Likewise, “[s]hareholders are also hurt when a 
plaintiffs’ firm in one of the competing jurisdictions seeks to 
accelerate the procedural posture of its case by pursuing a 
temporary restraining order or some other form of extra-
expedited relief that is not really appropriate for the facts of the 
                                                                                                     
 144. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 17, at 13–14.  
 145. Mark Lebovitch, Jerry Silk & Jeremy Friedman, Improving Multi-
Jurisdictional, Merger-Related Litigation, AM. B. ASS’N, COM. & BUS. LITIG. 
COMM., Feb. 14, 2011, at 1, http://www.blbglaw.com/news/publications/ 
data/00132/_res/id=sa_File1/Lebovitch_Silk_Friedman_reprint.pdf (accessed by 
searching “merger-related” in news search box). Mark Lebovitch and Jerry Silk 
are partners and Jeremy Friedman is an associate of Bernstein Litowitz Berger 
& Grossmann, LLP.  
 146. See MARK P.O. MORFORD & ROBERT J. LENARDON, CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 
567–68 (8th ed. 2007) (noting that for each head Hercules removed, the Hydra 
grew two more). 
 147. Lebovitch, Silk & Friedman, supra note 145, at 2. 
 148. See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text (discussing the risks 
inherent in releasing claims in settlement). 
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case.”149 Perhaps most problematic is the possibility that two or 
more jurists in competing jurisdictions will refuse to stay their 
respective cases in favor of litigation pending in another forum, 
subjecting defendants to simultaneous litigation in multiple fora, 
wasting judicial resources, and risking inconsistent findings of 
fact or interpretations of law.150 Indeed, this very risk 
materialized in recent years when then-Vice Chancellor Strine 
and New York State Supreme Court Justice Cahn proceeded 
forward on parallel tracks with separate actions challenging the 
same going-private transaction involving the Topps Company.151 
With those risks in mind, various members of the Court of 
Chancery and the corporate bar have proposed several solutions 
with varying success. One approach relies on traditional comity 
between sister state courts. Where the authoritative development 
of Delaware law is at stake in disputes involving entities that 
Delaware itself has created, Delaware arguably has the strongest 
                                                                                                     
 149. Lebovitch, Silk & Friedman, supra note 145, at 2; see also Strine, 
Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 14, at 89 (noting the “perverse incentives” 
in multi-forum litgation for “a plaintiffs’ law firm to ‘plant a flag’ in a distinct 
forum[,] afford[ing] that firm a degree of leverage in negotiating fee-sharing, 
regardless of whether initiating such litigation is beneficial to the corporation, 
its shareholders, or society as a whole.”). 
 150. See In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 5022-CC, 
2011 WL 1135016, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting “the possibility that 
two judges would apply the law differently or otherwise reach different 
outcomes . . . would then leave the law in a confused state and pose full faith 
and credit problems for all involved”). 
 151. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(“[W]hen this court is clearly an efficient and convenient forum prepared to 
issue a timely ruling, public policy and comity indicate that this state’s courts 
should answer the question of whether the pending Merger involving Topps 
should be enjoined.”); In re Topps Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 
WL 5018882, at *3–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007) (“[T]he Chancery Court’s 
belief that New York law requires this court to dismiss or stay this action in 
deference to the Delaware action is based on outdated and incorrect legal 
principles.”). On June 13, 2007, five days after Justice Cahn denied the 
defendants’ motion to stay the proceedings in New York, the New York 
Appellate Division, First Department, granted an interim stay of the litigation 
in New York. In re Topps Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 74300(U), 
2007 WL 2128297, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. July 19, 2007) (vacating the interim 
stay). The next day, June 14, Chancellor Strine issued an opinion preliminarily 
enjoining the shareholder meeting to vote on the pending transaction. In re 
Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 63 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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interest in having its courts articulate those legal rules.152 
Consistent with the strength of that interest, Delaware provides 
expedited, direct appeals to its Supreme Court.153 In addition, 
although Delaware courts, for comity reasons, generally “will 
defer to a first-filed action in another forum and will stay 
Delaware litigation pending adjudication of the same or similar 
issues in the competing forum,”154 the Court of Chancery has held 
that a formulaic, “first-filed” rule should “not apply with full 
force” in the case of competing stockholder representative actions 
dispersed throughout multiple jurisdictions,155 because “less 
deference [is due] to the speedy plaintiff’s choice of forum.”156 
Rather, “the chartering state[’s] . . . powerful interest in ensuring 
the uniform interpretation and enforcement of its corporation 
law” warrants greater consideration.157 Consequently, Delaware 
courts treat competing shareholder representative actions filed 
closely together in time as contemporaneously filed, allowing a 
more deliberative analysis of which of the competing courts is 
best positioned to adjudicate the dispute.158 That analysis takes 
                                                                                                     
 152. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 
1108, 1112–13 (Del. 2005) (“[I]n order to prevent corporations from being 
subjected to inconsistent legal standards, the authority to regulate a 
corporation’s internal affairs should not rest with multiple jurisdictions.”); In re 
Topps Co., 924 A.2d at 954–57 (“In a situation like this one, when this court is 
clearly an efficient and convenient forum prepared to issue a timely ruling, 
public policy and comity indicate that this state’s courts should answer the 
question . . . .”); Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 14, at 85 (arguing 
that the most important interest affected by shareholder representative suits “is 
the interest of the corporation’s equity investors,” who, as an otherwise 
dispersed group united by “the state of incorporation whose law they have 
chosen to govern their investment”); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 
645–46 (1982) (holding no state has a legitimate interest “in regulating the 
internal affairs of foreign corporations”). 
 153. DEL. CONST. art. 4, § 11, cl. 4. 
 154. WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 16, § 5.01 (citing McWane Cast Iron 
Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 1970)). 
 155. Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 156. Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 349 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 157. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 960 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 158. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 116–17 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (treating actions filed “within the same general time frame” in 
New York and Delaware as “contemporaneously filed”). 
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place under a general forum non conveniens rubric.159 At the 
same time, the Court of Chancery has deferred to sister states 
where the particular circumstances of a case indicate that that 
state’s interests are greater than Delaware’s,160 but rarely will 
that occur on matters concerning the application of Delaware 
corporation law.161 
Another proposed solution is the so-called “One Forum 
Motion,”162 where relatively early in the litigation, defendants’ 
                                                                                                     
 159. See WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 16, § 5.01 (“In addition to the 
comity considerations articulated in McWane, the Court of Chancery, in 
assessing motions to stay Delaware litigation under the first-filed rule, 
frequently analyzed the same ‘practicality’ factors traditionally applied under 
the forum non conveniens doctrine.”). 
 160. See, e.g., TA Instruments-Waters, LLC v. Univ. of Conn., 31 A.3d 1204, 
1210 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“The motion to expedite is denied out of respect for the 
superior interests of a sister state.”); Transcript of Record at 23–27, Walton v. 
Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2010) (C.A. No. 5216-VCS) (staying 
action involving a publicly traded Delaware LLC in favor of adjudication in Ohio 
because the LLC Agreement expressly provided for the application of Ohio 
fiduciary duty law); see also Diedenhofen-Lennartz v. Diedenhofen, 931 A.2d 
439, 451 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that because of Delaware’s strong interest in 
adjudicating its own corporation law, “Delaware has a related and equally 
important interest in affording comity to the courts of other jurisdictions when a 
dispute arises under foreign business law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 161. That did occur, however, in March and April 2008 when shareholders of 
Bear Stearns commenced independent actions in Delaware and New York 
challenging the investment bank’s eleventh-hour merger with JPMorgan, a 
transaction that had been brokered by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve to quarantine a severe shock to the national, and even international, 
financial system. See generally In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig. (Bear 
Stearns (Del.)), C.A. No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008); In 
re Bear Stearns Litig. (Bear Stearns (N.Y.)), 870 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2008). Because the “unusual set of facts [were] unlikely to recur,” because the 
New York cases were first filed and the New York court was attending diligently 
to them, and because the “extraordinary circumstances” required a rapid 
response from a competent court free from distractions, the Court of Chancery 
stayed the Delaware actions in favor of adjudication in New York. Bear Stearns 
(Del.), 2008 WL 959992, at *8. (Ultimately, the New York plaintiffs withdrew 
their motion for a preliminary injunction and sought only post-closing damages. 
See Bear Stearns (N.Y.), 870 N.Y.S.2d at 724 (reciting the procedural history of 
the case).) Exigencies such as these, however, are exceptional. 
 162. The One Forum Motion is referred to in some circumstances as a 
“Savitt motion” after its apparent inventor, William D. Savitt of Wachtell Lipton 
Rosen & Katz. See, e.g., Nierenberg v. CKx, Inc., C.A. Nos. 5545–CC, 6519–CC, 
6524–CC, 2011 WL 2185614, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2011) (referring to one 
forum motion as a Savitt motion although neither Savitt nor his firm filed the 
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counsel file concurrently in all jurisdictions a single motion 
requesting that the judges communicate directly and confer 
among themselves about which of the parallel actions should 
proceed and which should be stayed.163 It appears that in 
Delaware the Chancellor and four Vice Chancellors are receptive 
to such motions, in that these judges “have endorsed the 
approach and agreed to reach out to their judicial counterpart in 
the parallel litigation.”164 The effectiveness of such motions, 
however, remains somewhat uncertain. Under the doctrine 
surrounding injunctions in aid of jurisdiction, for example, the 
Court of Chancery “is empowered to enjoin a party . . . from 
removing the subject of the controversy to a foreign jurisdiction 
by filing a later action or proceeding in a foreign forum.”165 In 
contrast, some have suggested that, in concurrently filed, multi-
jurisdiction cases, each court “lack[s] the power to compel action 
in the [foreign] litigation absent cooperation from the [foreign] 
judge”;166 or, as put more forcefully by some commentators, “they 
are unnecessary where a foreign court is predisposed to defer to 
                                                                                                     
motion or represented any party to the case); see also C. Barr Flinn & Kathaleen 
St. J. McCormick, The Delaware Court of Chancery Endorses One Forum 
Motions as a Solution to Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation, YOUNG CONAWAY 
STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP, 1 n.2 (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.youngconaway.com 
(accessed by searching the document title under the publications tab) (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2013) (noting “the first One Forum Motion in Delaware was filed 
[by Savitt and his co-defense counsel] in In re Wyeth Shareholder Litigation”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 163. See generally Flinn & McCormick, supra note 162. 
 164. Id. at 3. Indeed, Chancellor Chandler, who retired from the bench in 
2011, indicated that one forum motions were his “personal preferred approach” 
to address multi-fora deal litigation. Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. 
No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 n.12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011). 
 165. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., C.A. Nos. 9281, 9221, 1988 
WL 34526, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 7, 1988). 
 166. Flinn & McCormick, supra note 162, at 3. In at least one case, for 
example, the court expressly “grant[ed] Defendants’ motion [to proceed in one 
jurisdiction] to the extent of confirming that this consolidated action in 
Delaware shall proceed,” but with the caveat that, “[a]s to whether the related 
actions before [the foreign judge] should be dismissed or stayed, I express no 
opinion.” Letter from Donald F. Parsons, Jr., Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of 
Chancery, to P. Bradford deLeeuw, Esq., et al., In re Comverge, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., C.A. No. 7368-VCP (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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the forum whose law is at stake and useless where a judge is 
determined to keep the case.”167 Hence, like comity, this solution 
ultimately may be more aspirational than actual. Nevertheless, 
the relatively recent invention of the One Forum Motion itself 
illustrates the virtually real-time engagement between the 
corporate bar and the Delaware courts in responding to the 
various dynamics affecting shareholder representative litigation 
specifically and the law of corporations more generally.  
At least one other prospective solution might be more 
effective, however. Recently, Delaware companies have been 
amending their certificates of incorporation and corporate bylaws 
to include “exclusive forum selection” clauses that would require 
shareholders to litigate so-called “internal affairs” claims in 
Delaware.168 There is nonbinding—and arguably conflicting—
precedent regarding the enforceability of these forum selection 
clauses,169 “and not all courts enforce forum choices even in 
                                                                                                     
 167. Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 14, at 79 n.217. 
 168. See generally Frank J. Aquila & Anna M. Kripitz, Designating 
Delaware: The Rise of Exclusive Forum Selection Provisions, PRAC. L. CO. (Oct. 1, 
2012), http://us.practicallaw.com/0-521-5321 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (“Facing 
duplicative and costly litigation in different courts, Delaware companies are 
increasingly adopting exclusive forum selection provisions that require 
shareholder class action and derivative lawsuits to be filed in a single court.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Frederick H. Alexander & 
Daniel D. Matthews, The Multi-Jurisdictional Stockholder Litigation Problem 
and the Forum Selection Solution, CORP. COUNS. WEEKLY, May 11, 2011 
(discussing, as a factual matter, recent charter and bylaw amendments to 
designate the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum for 
shareholder suits). For a scholarly analysis on the rise of exclusive forum 
selection clauses in corporate charters and bylaws, see Joseph A. Grundfest, The 
History & Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical 
Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333 (2012). 
 169. Compare In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (suggesting, in dictum, that a forum selection clause in a 
corporate charter or bylaw, because both are construed as contracts, could be 
enforceable), with Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (holding, as a matter of federal procedure, that a forum selection clause 
contained only in a bylaw (as opposed to a corporate charter) and adopted 
unilaterally by the board of directors (as opposed to with approval from 
shareholders) is unenforceable). The outcome of the Galaviz decision also might 
be limited by its facts: an alleged breach of fiduciary duty already had occurred 
when the board adopted the forum selection bylaw. Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 
1172. In refusing to enforce the bylaw, the court emphasized that “[p]articularly 
where, as here, the bylaw was adopted by the very individuals who are named 
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bilateral contracts.”170 In February 2012, shareholders brought 
suit in the Court of Chancery to challenge head-on the legality of 
such charter provisions and bylaws under Delaware law.171 The 
cases, currently assigned to the Chancellor, have not yet been 
decided, but are being followed closely by scholars and the 
practicing bar alike.172  
                                                                                                     
as defendants, and after the alleged wrongdoing took place, there is no element 
of mutual consent” necessary to sustain the forum selection clause as a freely 
negotiated contractual provision. Id. at 1171. It is not clear whether the same 
result necessarily follows if the alleged misconduct occurs after the bylaw’s 
adoption.  
 170. Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 14, at 79 n.217 (citing 
Idacorp, Inc. v. Am. Fiber Sys., Inc., No. 1:11–cv–00654, 2012 WL 4139925 (D. 
Idaho Sept. 19, 2012)). 
 171. Frank Aquila & Anna Kripitz, Forum-Selection Provisions in Delaware, 
CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/Pub 
ArticleCC.jsp?id=1202568858164&ForumSelection_Provisions_in_Delaware 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
More specifically, the class actions challenged the 
validity of forum selection bylaws unilaterally adopted by the boards 
of 12 Delaware companies. While 10 of the complaints have since 
been dismissed following the repeal of the bylaws in question, the 
defendants in the mooted cases were unable to stay plaintiffs’ fee 
petitions, which may be an indication of how the court will rule on 
the issue of validity in the two cases (against Chevron Corporation 
and FedEx Corporation) that are still proceeding. 
Id. 
 172. See, e.g., id. (“[I]t it is clear that forum-selection provisions will continue to 
be an important topic in corporate governance circles in 2013 and beyond.”); Francis 
Pileggi, Multiple New Suits Challenge Exclusive Forum Selection Bylaws in 
Delaware Court of Chancery, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2012/02/articles/chancery-court-
updates/multiple-new-suits-challenge-exclusive-forum-selection-bylaws-in-delaware-
court-of-chancery/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (“[T]oday we find noteworthy a bevy of 
new lawsuits just filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
As of October 2012, “at least 200 companies [had] designate[d] Delaware in their 
governing documents as the exclusive venue for intra-company disputes.” Aquila & 
Kripitz, supra note 168, at 50. Only twelve public companies, however, did so by 
submitting a proposed charter or bylaw amendment to shareholders for a vote; the 
remainder implemented the provision either before an initial public offering (IPO) or 
as a board-approved bylaw amendment. Id. at 51. Moreover, both proxy advisory 
firms and activist shareholders have opposed forum selection provisions in 
governing instruments. Id. Therefore, outside of the IPO context, companies still 
might face implementation hurdles as a practical matter regardless of whether the 
courts uphold exclusive forum selection provisions as a legal matter.  
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D. 220 or Not 220: Whether ‘Tis Nobler to Risk Outrageous 
Fortune and File Fast or to Take Up the Tools at Hand 
Thus far, we have addressed issues that typically arise in 
“direct actions.” For example, when corporate directors breach 
their fiduciary duty in the context of a merger, the breach 
generally harms shareholders directly by divesting them of their 
stock ownership. For that reason, the shareholders themselves 
have a claim that they can bring directly against the board and 
other corporate fiduciaries.173 Other breaches of duty, however, 
harm the corporation itself. These breaches harm the 
shareholders only derivatively as a function of the shareholders’ 
pro rata investment in the corporation.174 Examples include 
excessive or wasteful compensation or a fiduciary’s usurpation of 
a corporate opportunity.175 In such cases, the corporation itself 
possesses, and is entitled to enforce, the claim against the 
wrongdoers.176 Normally, the decision whether to initiate a 
lawsuit on the corporation’s behalf is vested in the company’s 
board of directors.177 But when the alleged wrongdoers are the 
very same directors who must make that decision, potential 
conflicts of interest necessarily arise. For potential conflicts of 
this kind, so-called “derivative actions” provide a remedy.178  
                                                                                                     
 173. As with any general rule, there are, of course, exceptions: 
[The test for whether a direct cause of action exists] is a two-element 
test: (1) who was injured and (2) who should recover . . . . 
[M]entioning a merger does not talismanically create a direct action. 
Instead, the court must look to all the facts of the complaint and 
determine for itself whether a direct claim exists. 
Dieterich v. Harrer, 857 A.2d 1017, 1027 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 174. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036–
37 (Del. 2004) (noting that a derivative suit allows shareholders to sue for 
harms felt by the corporation, and only indirectly by the shareholders). 
 175. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 514 (Del. Ch. 1978) 
(deciding a “derivative action involving allegations of waste of corporate assets 
and diversion of corporate opportunity”). 
 176. See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 208 n.45 (Del. 2008) (“Generally a 
cause of action belonging to a corporation can be asserted only by the 
corporation.”). 
 177. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. 
Ch. 2009). 
 178. See Schoon, 953 A.2d at 208 (noting the purpose of the derivative action 
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Since at least the early 1900s, the law of corporations has 
permitted shareholders to obtain judicial permission to litigate 
the rights of the corporation, but only if the shareholders first 
attempt to persuade the board to redress the wrong or are able to 
show the court why such an attempt would be futile.179 By 
empowering a shareholder to enforce the company’s claim against 
its directors, derivative actions upset the normal balance of rights 
and obligations between stockholders and directors that are 
fundamental to the law of corporations.180 Consequently, the 
importance of the shareholder’s pre-suit demand requirement is 
hard to overstate.181 Rather than impose an ordinary “notice 
pleading” standard, Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 requires 
plaintiffs in derivative actions to plead with particularity that 
either: (1) a majority of the board is so interested or so lacks 
independence, or (2) the challenged transaction is so beyond the 
bounds of reasonable business judgment, that the court can infer 
the directors simply are incapable of deciding objectively whether 
to pursue or otherwise redress the corporation’s claims.182  
Pleading a claim with particularity based solely on publicly 
available information, however, can be difficult.183 An important 
tool to make that task more manageable is DGCL Section 220. 
                                                                                                     
is to overcome conflicts of interest and, thus, injustices to the corporation). 
 179. WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 16, § 9.02[b][3][ii]; see also Baker v. 
Bankers’ Mortg. Co., 129 A. 775, 776 (Del. Ch. 1925) (“A stockholder may under 
certain circumstances sue in equity in right of the corporation. Where he does 
so, however, he asserts the right of the corporation. This he is not permitted to 
do, unless the circumstances be such that the corporation will not sue.”). 
 180. See Hamilton Partners, L.P. v. Englard, 11 A.3d 1180, 1202 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (“[A] derivative action impinges on the managerial freedom of 
directors . . . .”). 
 181. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984) (“[T]he demand 
requirement . . . exists [to give effect to] the fundamental precept that directors 
manage the business and affairs of corporations.”), overruled on other grounds 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 182. DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1(c); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253–54; Rales v. Blasband, 
634 A.2d 927, 930 (Del. 1993); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 183. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 387, 399–400 (2008) (“[P]rospective litigants encounter a practical obstacle 
to mustering sufficient facts to satisfy Aronson’s ‘particularity’ requirement . . . . 
One Delaware judge has noted the almost impossible burden that results when 
the relevant facts are not a matter of public knowledge.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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That statute permits a stockholder to seek court-ordered 
inspection of the corporation’s books and records if the 
stockholder has a “proper purpose . . . reasonably related to such 
person’s interests as a stockholder.”184 Investigating corporate 
malfeasance to satisfy the pre-suit demand requirement qualifies 
as such a purpose, provided the shareholder can present a 
credible basis for suspecting wrongdoing.185 As the Delaware 
Supreme Court recently reiterated, “Delaware courts have 
strongly encouraged stockholder-plaintiffs to utilize Section 220 
before filing a derivative action . . . .”186 Numerous other cases 
similarly exhort prospective derivative plaintiffs to employ the 
“tools at hand,” referring to a books and records action pursuant 
to DGCL Section 220, before commencing a plenary action,187 
                                                                                                     
 184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2010); see also id. § 220(c)(3) (affording 
rights of inspection by court order upon showing a proper purpose). An example 
of relevant “books and records” that a shareholder might seek would be the 
internal investigation report that a board considered before terminating an 
officer without cause and with a lucrative severance. 
 185. See King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc. (King I), 994 A.2d 354 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (“To cite one example, investigating corporate mismanagement . . . is a 
proper purpose for seeking a Section 220 books and records inspection.”), rev’d 
on other grounds, 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011). 
 186. King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc. (King II), 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 
2011) (emphasis added); accord South v. Baker, C.A. No. 7294-VCL, 2012 WL 
4372538, at *1 n.1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 2012) (“[O]ur Supreme Court has 
admonished stockholders repeatedly to use Section 220 . . . before filing suit” 
(footnote omitted)); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 344 
& n.22 (Del. Ch. 2012) (same). 
 187. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1056–57 (Del. 2004) (noting that 
the plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts to “support a reasonable doubt of 
independence” and asserting that “had [plaintiff] first brought a Section 220 
action seeking inspection of . . . books and records she might have uncovered 
facts that would have created a reasonable doubt”); White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 
543, 556–57 (Del. 2001) (“[T]his case demonstrates the salutary effects of a rule 
encouraging plaintiffs to conduct a thorough investigation, using the ‘tools at 
hand’ including the use of actions under [DGCL] § 220 for books and records, 
before filing a complaint.”); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266–67 (Del. 2000) 
(“Plaintiffs may well have the ‘tools at hand’ to develop the necessary facts for 
pleading purposes. For example, plaintiffs may seek relevant books and records 
of the corporation under Section 220 . . . .”); Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting 
& Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 567 & n.3 (Del. 1997) (noting that DGCL Section 220’s 
use to gather information is encouraged); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 
& n.10 (Del. 1993) (“[A] stockholder who has met the procedural requirements 
and has shown a specific proper purpose may use the summary procedure 
embodied in [DGCL Section 220] to investigate the possibility of corporate 
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because representative litigation—including derivative actions—
cannot “optimally serve investors unless suits are actually filed 
on the basis of a real concern that wrongdoing has occurred and 
after a proper investigation.”188  
But where, as has become common today, multiple plaintiffs 
file multiple complaints in multiple jurisdictions, plaintiffs and 
their firms risk losing their chance to participate in the 
leadership structure prosecuting the derivative suit if they 
dutifully pursue a Section 220 action. To avoid that risk, many 
plaintiffs engage in a race to the courthouse and file a complaint 
fast on the heels of a public announcement of some suspicious 
event without undertaking any prior investigation.189 Given most 
jurisdictions’ liberal rules of civil procedure favoring dismissal 
with leave to amend,190 competition for litigation arguably 
                                                                                                     
wrongdoing.”). 
 188. King I, 994 A.2d at 356. 
 189. As one relatively recent case articulated the dilemma for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys,  
[u]nder a first-to-file system, plaintiffs’ lawyers cannot act as 
stockholders collectively would want because by proceeding 
deliberately, a law firm risks losing control of the case to competitors 
who file immediately. For fast-filing lawyers, the resulting action has 
the dynamics of a lottery ticket. In most cases, the fast-filing plaintiff 
will not have pled a derivative claim that can overcome Rule 23.1. 
But in the rare case, fate may bless the fast-filer with something 
implicating the board, or a court might be offended by the magnitude 
of the corporate trauma and allow the derivative action to proceed. 
Pyott, 46 A.3d at 346. 
 190. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to 
amend a pleading] when justice so requires.”); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 15(a) 
(“[L]eave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”). Notably, Delaware is 
not such a jurisdiction, at least not in the Court of Chancery. Court of Chancery 
Rule 15(aaa) provides, in pertinent part, that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or 
23.1 “shall be with prejudice (and in the case of complaints brought pursuant to 
Rules 23 or 23.1 with prejudice to the named plaintiffs only) unless the court, for 
good cause shown, shall find that dismissal with prejudice would not be just 
under all the circumstances.” DEL. CT. CH. R. 15(aaa) (emphasis added). Thus, in 
Chancery, “when a plaintiff is confronted with a motion to dismiss under Rules 
12(b)(6) or 23.1, he or she must either ‘seek leave to amend [the] complaint or 
stand on [the] complaint and answer the motion to dismiss,’” but there typically 
will be no post-dismissal opportunity to buttress and refile a deficient pleading. 
Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
June 21, 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, 
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transforms plaintiffs’ difficult task of pleading with particularity 
into what some defendants view as a form of Sisyphean 
punishment. According to legend, the Greek gods punished King 
Sisyphus for his hubris by forcing him to roll a massive stone up 
a steep hill, only to have it roll back down again as he reached the 
summit, thus consigning the once-proud king to an eternity of 
useless effort and unending frustration.191 Today, a plaintiff can: 
(1) haphazardly cobble together a complaint that fails to plead 
demand excusal with particularity; (2) quickly file that complaint 
in a jurisdiction with liberal pleading rules in an effort to ensure 
“lead plaintiff” status; (3) perhaps suffer dismissal under Rule 
23.1, but with leave to amend; (4) then pursue a Section 220 
action in Delaware; and (5) only thereafter, refile a properly 
researched complaint. In this environment, one could argue, 
defendants face the wasteful exercise of litigating repeatedly the 
issue of demand excusal, much like King Sisyphus and his uphill 
struggle.192  
Chancellor Strine addressed this problem in King v. 
VeriFone.193 Sympathetic to Sisyphean frustration, he wrote, “the 
intended end of the derivative lawsuit is not furthering the 
interests of fast-filing plaintiffs or their lawyers; rather, the 
derivative suit is one of several tools that stockholders may use to 
further the corporation’s best interests.”194 To “encourage the 
kind of litigation conduct that is more likely to benefit investors 
as a class,”195 he attempted to establish a bright-line rule: once a 
stockholder files a derivative action complaint, that stockholder is 
barred from pursuing a related books and record action 
thereafter.196 That rule effectively would have forced plaintiffs to 
                                                                                                     
C.A. No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010)). 
 191. MORFORD & LENARDON, supra note 146, at 354. 
 192. See Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance 
Litigation: Section 220 Demands-Reprise, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1287, 1297–98 
(2006) (noting that improper demand results in the waste of resources of the 
litigants and the Court). 
 193. King I, 994 A.2d 354, 356 (Del. Ch. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 12 
A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011).  
 194. Id. at 362 (emphasis added). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. at 356–57 (“[S]tockholders who seek books and records in order 
to determine whether to bring a derivative suit should do so before filing. . . . 
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exhaust diligently the “tools at hand” and prepare the strongest 
possible complaint before filing it.197 The Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed.198 While recognizing the potential abuse of 
Section 220 and explicitly continuing to encourage plaintiffs to 
employ it early, the Delaware Supreme Court held nevertheless 
that nothing in the statutory text supported the bright-line rule 
employed by the Chancellor.199 Rather, the decisional law made 
clear that investigation of corporate misconduct is a proper 
purpose for bringing a Section 220 action so long as the plenary 
court has granted the shareholder-plaintiff leave to amend the 
complaint.200  
The applicability of this last example to the thesis of this 
Article—i.e., that caseload volume involving similar issues leads 
to refined doctrine, valuable predictability, and measured 
balance—may not be immediately apparent. Nevertheless, King 
is a salient example of the unique benefits case volume provides 
in at least two respects. First, case volume enabled the Court of 
Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court alike to recognize a 
problem in the first instance and address it head-on. Indeed, in 
                                                                                                     
Once a plaintiff has chosen to file a derivative suit, it has chosen its 
course . . . .”). 
 197. See id. at 356–57 (discussing the policies supported by a bright-line 
rule). 
 198. King II, 12 A.3d 1140, 1151 (Del. 2011). 
 199. As the Supreme Court put it, 
[a]lthough we reject the result reached by the Court of Chancery, and 
the bright-line rule that drove it, we are sensitive to the policy 
concerns that animated both. . . . If relief under Section 220 is to be 
restricted in the manner adjudicated by the Court of Chancery, any 
such restriction should be imposed expressly by the General 
Assembly, not decreed by judicial common law decision-making. 
Id. at 1150–51. 
 200. See id. at 1149–50 (“[L]ong-standing Delaware precedent . . . recognizes 
that it is a proper purpose under Section 220 to inspect books and records that 
would aid the plaintiff . . . where the earlier-filed plenary complaint was 
dismissed on demand futility-related grounds without prejudice and with leave 
to amend.”); accord Amalgamated Bank v. NetApp, Inc., C.A. No. 6772-VCG, 
2012 WL 379908, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2012) (“King stands for the limited 
proposition that when a plaintiff has been granted leave to amend its complaint 
a plaintiff may have a proper purpose for demanding such records. When that 
leave to amend no longer exists, a plaintiff’s proper purpose is extinguished.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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King, the two decisions diverge only as to the solution. In the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s view, the Chancellor’s proposal 
required legislative, rather than judicial, action.201 It is 
questionable whether jurists in other jurisdictions who only 
infrequently confront motions to dismiss for failure to make pre-
suit demand could have grasped the tension as readily as the 
Chancellor and the Justices who grappled with how to solve it in 
King. The relatively small number of jurists involved (ten) and 
the fact that they all routinely encounter business entity issues of 
this nature helps to foster the nuanced and well-informed 
character of Delaware’s decisional law. 
Second, case volume affords lower courts successive 
opportunities to remedy perceived problems in the law to the 
satisfaction of their appellate courts.202 The recent South v. 
Baker203 decision provides a useful example. After a series of 
accidents in 2011 at silver mines operated by Hecla Mining 
Company (Hecla), the United States Mine Safety and Health 
Administration ordered the company to close one of its mines for 
                                                                                                     
 201. King II, 12 A.3d at 1151. 
 202. Indeed, King itself was a second attempt to address the fast-filing 
problem. In two earlier cases, the Court of Chancery “declin[ed] to infer ‘the 
existence of other facts [not explicitly alleged in the complaint] that would have 
been proved or disproven by a further pre-suit investigation.’” Beam v. Stewart, 
833 A.2d 961, 981 n.66, 982 (Del. Ch. 2003) (quoting White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 
356, 364 (Del. Ch. 2000)), aff’d on other grounds, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). 
That is, the Beam and White courts essentially proposed that, if a plaintiff has 
not pursued a books and records action, courts should draw fewer inferences in 
the plaintiff’s favor from the allegations actually made. See id. at 970 (“[T]he 
Court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in the amended 
complaint, but conclusory statements—those unsupported by well-pled factual 
allegations—are not accepted as true.”); White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 363 (Del. 
Ch. 2000) (noting that courts need not make inferences with no support in fact). 
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed White and affirmed Beam on alternate 
grounds because  
[a] plaintiff’s use of, or failure to use, a books and records inspection 
does not change the standard to be applied to review of the complaint. 
Regardless of whether the plaintiff secured any facts alleged in her 
complaint through a Section 220 inspection, the court must draw all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor and determine whether 
those facts create a reasonable doubt of the directors’ independence. 
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1057 n.52 (Del. 2004). 
 203. South v. Baker, C.A. No. 7294-VCL, 2012 WL 4372538 (Del. Ch. Sept. 
25, 2012). 
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safety violations.204 Consequently, Hecla issued a press release 
announcing that it was lowering its estimated silver production 
for 2012.205 On the heels of that announcement, shareholders 
brought a so-called Caremark206 claim. That is, the plaintiffs 
accused Hecla’s directors of breaching their fiduciary duty by 
failing to monitor or heed proverbial “red flags” indicating 
misconduct within the company that, but for the directors’ failure 
of oversight, could have enabled the company to take remedial 
measures and avoid legal liability or other corporate losses.207 
The plaintiffs, however, did not avail themselves of Section 220 
before filing their complaint. The court ultimately determined 
that the complaint lacked the particularized allegations 
necessary to plead demand futility under Court of Chancery Rule 
23.1.208 Accordingly, the court dismissed the case.209  
In so doing, the court expressly held that the putative lead 
plaintiffs provided inadequate representation for failing to utilize 
Section 220.210 Specifically, the court observed that, “[i]n a 
representative action, a trial court has an independent and 
continuing duty to scrutinize the representative plaintiff to see if 
                                                                                                     
 204. Id. at *3–6. 
 205. Id. at *1. 
 206. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 207. South, 2012 WL 4372538, at *1; see also In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 
971 (“[A] sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such 
as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting 
system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition 
to liability.”). 
 208. South, 2012 WL 4372538, at *11. 
 209. Id. at *13. 
 210. Id. at *7. Although the South court could have dismissed the complaint 
under Rule 23.1 alone, it felt compelled to engage in this extra analysis because 
(1) “good faith disagreements exist about whether other stockholders of the 
corporation are in privity with the named plaintiff such that the with-prejudice 
dismissal has preclusive effect on other derivative actions,” but (2) even the 
precedents “that give preclusive effect to a Rule 23.1 dismissal universally 
recognize that another stockholder still can sue if the first plaintiff provided 
inadequate representation.” Id. Thus, the court’s judicial finding that the Souths 
provided inadequate representation preserves the ability of “other stockholders 
to bring suit, including those stockholders who have attempted to use Section 
220.” Id. at *14 (emphasis added).  
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she is providing adequate representation,”211 and that (as the 
Delaware Supreme Court suggested in King v. Verifone) “‘[o]ne 
possible remedy for a prematurely-filed derivative action might 
be for the plenary court to deny the plaintiff lead plaintiff status 
in such a situation.’”212 Employing that suggestion, the South 
court ruled that a plaintiff who hastily files Caremark claims 
without first conducting an adequate investigation aided by a 
corporate books and records inspection under Section 220  
behaves contrary to the interests of the corporation but 
consistent with the desires of the filing law firm to gain control 
of (or a role in) the litigation. The natural and logical inference 
from this recurring scenario is that the plaintiff is serving the 
interests of the law firm, rather than those of the corporation 
on whose behalf the plaintiff ostensibly seeks to litigate.213 
That is, the “recurring scenario supports a presumption that the 
plaintiff has acted disloyally and is not an adequate fiduciary for 
the corporation.”214  
In both developing and applying this presumption of 
inadequate representation for not utilizing Section 220, the court 
was careful to note two important qualifications. First, the court 
explicitly differentiated a Caremark claim—for which “the 
connection to the board is neither readily apparent nor 
reasonably inferable from the occurrence of the corporate 
trauma” and “there usually will not be any need to rush when 
filing . . . [because t]he claim typically seeks to obtain damages” 
for a discrete harm that already has occurred—“from other types 
of derivative actions in which a plaintiff challenges a specific and 
identifiable board decision.”215 
                                                                                                     
 211. Id. at *15. 
 212. Id. at *13 (quoting King II, 12 A.3d 1140, 1151 (Del. 2011)). 
 213. Id. at *17. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. Unlike a Caremark claim, a plaintiff challenging specific and 
identifiable board decisions  
may well be able to plead particularized allegations without using 
Section 220 that are sufficient to survive a Rule 23.1 motion to 
dismiss, for example by pleading that a majority of the directors were 
not independent and disinterested (as when directors vote on their 
own compensation) or that the decision was not entitled to the 
protections of the business judgment rule (as when a transaction 
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Second, the court stressed that, under Delaware Rule of 
Evidence 301, presumptions are rebuttable, meaning that a 
plaintiff can show that, in fact, he or she did conduct a reasonable 
investigation or that there was a need to act with celerity in the 
circumstances of the particular case, i.e., “that acting speedily 
benefited the corporation and not just the plaintiffs’ law firm.”216 
Despite these express qualifications, the presumption of 
inadequate representation very well might undermine the 
incentive to race to file in the first instance in future cases—
assuming, of course, the Delaware Supreme Court condones its 
use. 
Another solution, proposed by Chancellor Strine in February 
2012, is when determining which complaint was first-filed for 
purposes of consolidation or appointment of lead counsel, the 
relevant filing date should relate back to the earlier Section 220 
action, if one was filed.217 That approach would put the plaintiff’s 
counsel who first pursue a statutory books and records action 
before filing their complaint on an equal footing with the “fast 
filers,” thereby undercutting the incentive to file quickly. Courts 
that are asked to appoint lead plaintiffs and counsel from several 
competing parties and firms generally will consider, among other 
things, the quality of the pleadings as an indicator of the type of 
representation the putative lead plaintiffs and their counsel 
likely will provide.218 Although the Chancellor’s “relation back” 
approach is an intriguing notion, it may face its own multi-
jurisdictional issues. That is, even if the determination of lead 
counsel in Delaware requires relating back to the filing date of 
the Section 220 action, would judges in other jurisdictions 
                                                                                                     
meets the onerous standard for waste).  
Id. (footnote omitted).  
 216. Id. (citing DEL. R. EVID. 301). 
 217. See Transcript of Record at 34–36, La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. 
Page (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2012) (C.A. No. 7041-CS) (“Perhaps we should start 
thinking about a diligent books and records demand about wrongdoing as 
having somewhat of the same dignity as a first-filed complaint but done by 
people who are doing it the right way.”). 
 218. Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., C.A. Nos. 19575, 19578, 19592, 
19608, 19613, 19632, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002). 
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confronting whom to designate as lead counsel in representative 
litigation in their own courts be persuaded to do the same?  
Lastly, there is the possibility that someone will embrace the 
Supreme Court’s suggestion in King. If nothing in the statutory 
text of Section 220 supports the Chancellor’s rebuffed bright-line 
rule from King, the Delaware Corporate Law Council could urge 
the Delaware General Assembly to amend the statute. As alluded 
to earlier, in a small state like Delaware, amending a statute is 
considerably easier than one might think. The corporate bar 
regularly engages with both the courts and the legislature 
because all of them have an important shared interest in 
maintaining a General Corporation Law that is appropriately 
balanced, fair, and effective for each legal issue that may arise in 
contemporary and dynamic capital markets. 
IV. Conclusion 
The overarching theme of this Article has been that 
Delaware’s volume of corporate and alternative business entity 
cases, the fact that those cases are litigated before the relatively 
small, but expert, Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme 
Court, and the responsiveness of its courts, its legislature, and 
the marketplace generally accelerate the development of refined 
doctrine, measured balance, and valuable predictability. This 
Article, of course, is hardly the first to recognize or to describe 
that theme,219 but the matters reviewed here demonstrate that 
                                                                                                     
 219. See, e.g., Savitt, supra note 21, 585–86 (describing the Court of 
Chancery “as an unusual and remarkably effective regulatory machine” in part 
because of the “vast amount of M&A activity” it sees); Aquila & Kripitz, supra 
note 168, at 50 (“Delaware is known as the premier forum for resolving . . . 
internal [corporate] disputes . . . .”); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the 
Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1061, 1080–81 (2000) (“Delaware courts aggressively adopt and modify 
corporate law doctrine, exhibiting a degree of activism that more closely 
resembles the legislative process[,] . . . driven by policy considerations, including 
an effort to respond on an ongoing basis to developments in the business 
world.”); Rehnquist, supra note 41, at 354; Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law 
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 588–89 
(1990) (arguing that Delaware’s prominence as a state of incorporation is due to 
the expertise of its judiciary). 
DOCKET DIVIDENDS 525 
the Court of Chancery’s unique characteristics facilitate its 
ability to respond to challenging new issues of substantive and 
procedural law alike. Indeed, institutional success for the Court 
of Chancery, because of its de facto specialization in a substantive 
field that lends itself to collective-action problems, depends on 
refined doctrine and measured balance as to the procedural 
mechanisms that are central to the development of Delaware 
commercial law. This overarching theme also demonstrates the 
relatively common phenomenon in Delaware that at any one time 
multiple disputes pertaining to some particular area of 
corporation law will be before the Court at once. In 2011 and 
2012, one of the areas that came more directly under the judicial 
microscope encompassed important aspects of representative 
shareholder actions. Although not all of the issues in that area 
have achieved the level of predictability, efficiency, or stasis to 
which the law aspires, the special nature of the Court of 
Chancery and its docket enabled it to accomplish quite a lot in a 
short time span. The result is greater clarity regarding important 
aspects of representative litigation and, we hope, more effective 
representation of shareholders’ interests in the future. If recent 
history provides an accurate barometer, many of the legal issues 
we have addressed will be almost passé by the time this Article is 
published because they will have been replaced by clusters of new 
cases presenting various manifestations of the different issues du 
jour for 2013 and beyond. Whatever the future issues may be, we 
are confident that, for the reasons discussed in this Article, the 
Delaware courts and the Court of Chancery, in particular, 
together with the Delaware legislature and bar, will remain 
adept in meeting the inevitable challenges and innovations the 
marketplace brings before them. 
  
